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4PREFACE
This paper sets out a possible approach to the international taxation of corporate
profit: a destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT). This option is one of a number that
have been considered over the last three years by a group of economists and lawyers,
chaired by Michael Devereux. The other current members of the group are Alan
Auerbach, Michael Keen, Paul Oosterhuis, Wolfgang Schön and John Vella.
The group’s intention is to produce a book which provides an extensive discussion of
alternative ways in which jurisdictions might tax a share of the profit of multinational
companies, including the existing system and well-known alternatives such as
formulary apportionment. The book will analyse in detail two reform proposals, a
DBCFT and a “residual profit allocation”, which is based more closely on the existing
framework for taxing multinational profit. Members of the group presented both of
these ideas in public conferences at Oxford University in June 2016, and at the Tax
Policy Center in Washington DC in July 2016, as well as at other events in Europe and
the USA.
In June 2016, the Ways and Means Committee of the US House of Representatives
published a Blueprint document “A Better Way for Tax Reform”,1 which proposes a
version of a DBCFT. In the light of the public interest in this idea, the group has decided
to publish this paper in advance of completing the book; in effect it is a draft of one
chapter of the book. The intention of publishing this now is to help inform the public
debate about the properties of a DBCFT, and to highlight and discuss issues that would
arise in its implementation.
The paper shows that the DBCFT is equivalent in economic terms to a reform that
introduces a broad-based, uniform rate VAT (or achieves the same effect through an
existing VAT), and reduces taxes on payroll by the same proportion. Each of these two
options has advantages and disadvantages in terms of implementation, which are set
out and discussed in the paper.
The authors of this paper would like to thank several people who have contributed to
their thinking about the DBCFT and other options, especially group members Paul
Oosterhuis and Wolfgang Schön. We are also grateful to have received helpful
1 https://waysandmeans.house.gov/taxreform/
5comments from, among others: Rosanne Altshuler, Jennifer Blouin, Stephen Bond, Ian
Brimicombe, Alex Cobham, Rita de la Feria, Steve Edge, Judith Freedman, Malcolm
Gammie, Michael Graetz, Rachel Griffith, Itai Grinberg, Valeska Gronert, Michelle
Hanlon, Chris Heady, Jim Hines, Vanessa Houlder, John Kay, Ed Kleinbard, Ben
Lockwood, Mark Mazur, Peter Merrill, Will Morris, Paul Morton, Tom Neubig, John
Samuels, John Sherman, Joel Slemrod, Eric Toder, Al Warren, David Weisbach and staff
at the International Monetary Fund. The contents of this paper are the sole
responsibility of the four named authors. Views expressed here should not be
attributed to the IMF, its staff, Executive Board or its Management.
Devereux and Vella are grateful to the Nuffield Foundation for financial support.
For correspondence, please email michael.devereux@sbs.ox.ac.uk.
6EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper presents, analyses, and further develops the idea of a destination-based
cash-flow tax (DBCFT). Its purpose is expositional: to describe the DBCFT, how it might
work, what its effects would be and some of the challenges that its implementation
would face.
The DBCFT has two basic components.
 The “cash flow” element gives immediate relief to all expenditure, including
capital expenditure, and taxes revenues as they accrue.
 The “destination-based” element introduces border adjustments of the same form
as under the value added tax (VAT): exports are untaxed, while imports are taxed.
This is equivalent in its economic impact to introducing a broad-based, uniform rate
Value Added Tax (VAT) - or achieving the same effect through an existing VAT - and
making a corresponding reduction in taxes on wages and salaries.
The paper evaluates the DBCFT against five criteria: economic efficiency, robustness
to avoidance and evasion, ease of administration, fairness and stability. And it does so
both for the case of universal adoption by all countries and the more plausible case of
unilateral adoption.
In contrast with existing systems of taxing corporate profit, especially in an
international environment, the DBCFT and VAT-based equivalent have significant
attractions:
 A central motivation for the DBCFT is to improve economic efficiency by taxing
business income in a relatively immobile location – that is, the location of final
purchasers of goods and services (the “destination”). The DBCFT should not distort
either the scale or the location of business investment and eliminates the tax bias
towards debt finance by assuring neutral treatment of debt and equity as sources
of finance.
 Taxing business income in the place of destination also has the considerable
advantage that the DBCFT is also robust against avoidance through inter-company
7transactions. Common means of tax avoidance – including the use of inter-
company debt, locating intangible property in low-tax jurisdictions and mispricing
inter-company transactions - would not be successful in reducing tax liabilities
under a DBCFT.
Here however the distinction between universal and unilateral adoption is
important. With adoption by only a subset of countries, those not adopting are
likely to find their profit shifting problems to be intensified: companies operating in
high tax countries, for instance, which may seek to artificially over-price their
imports, will face no countervailing tax when sourcing them by exporting from
related companies in DBCFT countries.
 By the same token, the DBCFT provides long term stability since countries would
broadly have an incentive to adopt it – either to gain a competitive advantage over
countries with a conventional origin-based tax, or to avoid a competitive
disadvantage relative to countries that had already implemented a DBCFT. It would
also be resistant to tax competition in tax rates.
In terms of its distributional impact, given the equivalence between a DBCFT and a VAT
combined with a labour tax cut, the incidence of the tax would be on domestic
residents financing consumption other than from wages, including from profit subject
to the DBCFT. In that respect, the DBCFT would be more progressive than a single rate
VAT, and possibly more so than existing corporate taxes (the burden of which may fall
largely on labour). If desired, it would be possible to maintain a tax on the return to
capital at the personal level, though the paper does not elaborate on this.
Fairness between countries is harder to assess, but – combined with taxes on natural
resources – some very preliminary evidence suggests that few countries would be
likely to see a reduction in their tax base as a result of border adjustment in itself.
The paper looks closely at the application of DBCFT treatment to the financial sector,
which is a familiar problem under the VAT but has been little considered under the
DBCFT. It compares two alternative approaches, based on the Meade Committee’s ‘R-
base’ (taxing only “real” flows) and its ‘R+F’ base (taxing “real and financial”) flows.
There are shown to be equivalent for transactions between taxed entities.
Administrative considerations suggest applying the R base to most companies, but also
8taxing financial flows between financial companies and tax exempt entities and
individuals
The DBCFT raises a number of significant implementation issues - both administrative
and legal - and requires substantial changes, both conceptually and in application,
from current practice in corporate taxation. Neither of its two principal design
features, a cash flow tax base and taxation on a destination basis, are commonplace
amongst existing corporation taxes. Issues related to losses, familiar under the VAT,
would be amplified. The paper sets out this and other core implementation issues,
and how they might be addressed. It also compares the implementation of a DBCFT
with the economically equivalent VAT-based approach, setting out the advantages
and disadvantages of each.
One critical legal issue is that many have argued that the basic DBCFT, with an
integrated relief for labour costs, is inconsistent with WTO rules. However, this is not
true of the economically equivalent VAT-based approach, either on the usual invoice-
credit basis, or on a subtraction method. It is also possible that the DBCFT would be
considered to be within the ambit of bilateral income tax treaties, in which case it
would clearly be inconsistent with several of the typical provisions of such treaties.
For any country, replacing a conventional corporate income tax by a DBCFT, or VAT-
based equivalent, would be a major undertaking. This paper considers core issues of
design and implementation, but the assessment of any proposal must evaluate its
details, including in relation to possible accompanying measures. Deviations from the
design principles set out in the paper could alter significantly the analysis it provides
and the conclusions that it reaches. For any proposal, careful, country-specific
assessment of design, implementation and probable effects, including those for other
countries, will be essential.
9I. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents, analyses, and further develops the idea of a destination-based
cash-flow tax (DBCFT).2
The DBCFT has several highly attractive properties: it does not distort the scale and
location of investment, assures neutral treatment of debt and equity as sources of
finance, is robust against avoidance through inter-company transactions, and provides
long term stability due to its incentive compatibility and its resistance to tax
competition amongst states. The DBCFT thus addresses many of the ailments afflicting
current tax systems in both purely domestic and international settings.
On the other hand, the DBCFT raises a number of significant implementation issues -
both administrative and legal - and requires substantial changes, both conceptually
and in application, from current practice in corporate taxation. Neither of its two
principal design features, a cash flow tax base and taxation on a destination basis, are
commonplace amongst existing corporation taxes.3
The purpose of this paper is expositional: to describe the DBCFT, how it might work,
what its effects would be and some of the challenges its implementation would face.
To this end, the paper starts by outlining how a DBCFT would work, and elaborating
on its key elements, including the nature and role of border tax adjustments. We
show too that a tax reform with equivalent economic effects would be to introduce a
broad-based, uniform rate Value Added Tax (VAT) - or achieve the same effect by
raising the rate of an existing VAT - and making a corresponding reduction in taxes on
wages and salaries. Section 2 then evaluates the DBCFT on the basis of five criteria:
economic efficiency, robustness to avoidance and evasion, ease of administration,
fairness and stability. In doing so we deal in turn with two cases: that in which all
countries adopt a DBCFT (or VAT-based equivalent) and that in which adoption is
unilateral. Section 3 then considers the treatment of financial flows, from both
conceptual and practical perspectives. This is as an important issue that has not
2 For earlier discussions of the DBCFT, see Bond and Devereux (2002), President’s Advisory Panel on
Federal Tax Reform (2005), Devereux and Birch Sorensen (2006), European Economic Advisory Group
(2007), Auerbach, Devereux and Simpson (2010), Auerbach (2010), Devereux (2012) and Auerbach and
Devereux (2015). See also Avi-Yonah and Clausing (2016) and Cui (2016).
3 The only national-level cash flow tax of which we are aware is the Mexican IETU, which operated (as a
minimum tax) between 2007 and 2014, apparently without major technical difficulty.
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previously been considered in detail. Finally, Section 4 takes up a range of
implementation issues, though the paper does not attempt a full treatment of all the
issues that are likely to arise in practice (many of which are likely to be country-
specific).
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II. THE DBCFT IN OUTLINE
The DBCFT has two distinct attributes: a cash-flow tax base and a destination basis. A
destination basis could be applied to a variety of tax bases, and arguments for cash-
flow taxation originally arose in a purely domestic setting. But there are advantages to
combining the destination basis and the cash-flow tax base. This section recalls the
features of a cash flow tax operating in a single economy, explains what destination-
basing would mean and what a DBCFT would look like, and shows its economic
equivalence to the combination of a VAT and a reduction of taxes on labour by the
same amount.
1. Cash flow taxation
Cash flow taxation in a single economy has been studied at length.4 As its name
implies, a cash flow tax applies to net receipts arising in the business. Receipts are
included in the tax base when payment is received and expenses are recognized when
payment is paid.5 The tax base in any given period is the former less the latter. The
most significant difference in the timing of the inclusion of receipts and expenses in
the base, compared to most existing corporate tax systems, is that under cash flow
taxation even capital assets that are typically depreciated over time are immediately
expensed (i.e. deducted in full upon purchase). There is therefore no need for
complex depreciation rules that are typically found under current systems, and no
need to differentiate between different types of assets. This also introduces a
significant difference between the cash-flow tax base and measures of profit in
financial statements.
In the terminology of the Meade Committee (1978), a cash-flow tax could be levied on
a company on an R (real) base or an R+F (real plus financial) base. Under the R base,
transactions involving financial assets and liabilities are ignored – so, for example,
interest receipts would not be taxed and interest expenses would not be deductible.
4 The idea of the cash flow tax dates back to Brown (1948), and has since been the subject of an
extensive literature that began with Kaldor (1955), Andrews (1974), US Treasury (1977), Meade (1978)
and Graetz (1979). Readers familiar with properties of cash flow taxation in a closed economy can easily
skip this subsection.
5 More precisely, the tax would naturally be based on an accruals basis so that, for example, receipts are
recorded when the obligation to pay is incurred, rather than when cash is actually received. The accruals
basis would also apply to purchases, including of capital assets. Similar arrangements are common, of
course, under the VAT.
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The R base is thus limited to the difference between real inflows (from the sale of
products, services and real assets) and real outflows (from the purchase of materials,
products, services – including labour – and real assets). By contrast, under the R+F
base, all cash inflows, including borrowing and the receipt of interest, would be
taxable; all cash outflows, including lending, repaying borrowing and interest
payments would be subtracted in calculating the tax base. That is, the tax would apply
to all net financial inflows related to borrowing, including principal amounts, as well
as to net real inflows.6 The choice between an R and an R+F base is discussed in detail
below.
The properties of the cash flow tax, conceived of as operating in a single economy, are
well-known and so treated only briefly here. The starting point for understanding
them is the usual assumption that an investor seeks to maximize the net present
value (NPV) profit of an investment, measured as the sum of all discounted cash flows
associated with it. The discounting effectively adjusts for interest that might
otherwise have been earned during the intervening period. For instance, in the
example below, assuming a discount rate of 10%, a cash flow of 110 in one year’s time
has a present value of 100. Since the discounting approach adjusts for a required rate
of return on an investment, the NPV is a measure of the economic rent of an
investment. In principle, it is worth undertaking any project with a NPV greater than
zero; and it is not worth undertaking any project with a NPV less than zero. Any tax
that falls only on economic rent (and has a rate between zero and 100%) has the
property that the post-tax NPV of an investment has the same sign as the pre-tax
NPV. In this case, any investment worth undertaking in the absence of tax remains
worth undertaking in the presence of tax, and vice versa. Hence the investment
decision is independent of a tax on economic rent.
The example in Box 1 shows that a cash flow tax can indeed be thought of as a tax on
the NPV, or economic rent, of an investment. Intuitively, cash flow taxation is neutral
because, in effect, the government contributes a proportion of all costs of the
business (through giving tax relief for all costs when they are incurred), and takes the
same proportion of all receipts. In effect, the government becomes a shareholder in
the business. Like other cases in which the ownership of shares in a business changes,
this in itself has no effect on the profitability of the business, or on marginal
6 The Meade committee discussed a third form: the ‘S’ base cash flow tax, levied on net distributions to
shareholders. As a consequence of the identity between a firm’s sources and uses of funds, an S-base
tax is precisely equivalent to an R+F-based one, at least in a domestic context.
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investment and financial decisions. By taxing all cash flows at the same rate, the
government captures that same proportion of economic rent.7
Box 1. Neutrality of cash flow taxation in a single economy setting
Consider a two-period investment, with a cost of 100 in period 1, an interest rate of 10%,
and a tax rate of 20%. Under a cash flow tax, there is a negative tax liability in period 1 of -
20. In period 2 the investment makes a return. For an investment that just breaks even, the
total value of the investment in period 2 must be 110: this represents a rate of return of
10%, equal to the discount rate. The total return of 110 generates a tax liability in period 2
of 22. In NPV terms, the NPV pre-tax and post-tax are both zero. That is, the economic rent
before and after tax are both zero. The tax also has a NPV of zero; that is consistent with
the tax only falling on economic rent.
Illustration of properties of a cash flow tax on investment incentives
Pre-tax cash flows Cash flow tax Net cash flows
Period 1 outflows 100 -20 80
Marginal investment
Period 2 inflows 110 22 88
NPV, at 10% discount rate 0 0 0
Rate of return earned 10% - 10%
With economic rent
Period 2 inflows 132 26.4 105.6
NPV, at 10% discount rate 20 4 16
Rate of return earned 32% - 32%
In the lower part of the table, we assume instead that the investment generates a return of
32%, that is, it is worth 132 in period 2. Combined with the initial outlay of 100, that
represents a net present value of 20.8 Tax due in period 2 is 26.4, implying that the NPV of
the tax is 4. That leaves a post-NPV of 16. Since both the pre-tax and post-tax NPVs are
positive, the investment is attractive to the investor irrespective of the tax. Note also, that
the NPV of the tax is equal to 20% of the pre-tax NPV of the investment; so the tax is
effectively a tax on the economic rent of the investment. That is why it does not affect the
investment decision. This also implies that the post-tax rate of return (a return of 105.6 on
a net investment of 80) is also 32% - the same as the pre-tax rate of return.
7 Complications may arise in practice. For example, this simple characterisation assumes a symmetric tax
system, in which the government collects tax when cash flows are positive, but effectively makes a tax
rebate when cash flows are negative. The appropriate treatment of losses is discussed below in a
number of different settings.
8 The net present value of a cash flow arising in the next period is calculated by dividing the value of the
cash flow by 1 plus the interest rate, expressed as a decimal. Thus, in this case, the NPV of 132 is
132/1.1=120.
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The neutrality of cash flow taxation applies also to financial decision-making. Existing
taxes on corporate profit generally treat debt and equity asymmetrically: the return on
debt is generally deductible from the corporate tax base, whilst the return to equity is
not. This favourable treatment of debt distorts the choice of financing between debt
and equity financing, leading to leverage ratios that are higher than they would
otherwise be.9 This is a significant concern: socially excessive levels of debt, especially
in the financial sector, are widely seen as having played a central role in triggering and
deepening the financial crisis of 2008.
By contrast, cash flow taxes, either with an R or an R+F base, do not distort the choice
between debt and equity. This is easily seen in the case of an R base, since all financial
flows are simply ignored, be they associated with debt or equity. But the same applies
to the R+F base. We return to this issue in more detail below.
However, there are caveats to this analysis. One is that cash flow taxes lose their
neutrality if the tax rate is expected to change over time: a falling rate will encourage
investment, for instance, since the cost is deducted at a higher rate than it is later
taxed. Second, even cash flow taxes may distort the choice between mutually
exclusive projects which face different tax rates; the classic case in which this is a
factor is in location choices between countries, as we discuss below, but this could
also occur in a purely domestic context. Third, the analysis is based on the assumption
that a business will aim to maximize its value, summarized by the NPV. This may not
necessarily be the case. One possibility, for example, is that managers with a short
term horizon will seek to maximize current profit as recorded in financial statements;
this is more likely, of course, if managers’ own remuneration depends on current
financial earnings. In some cases, this may not be consistent with maximizing the NPV
of the business. At various points in the discussion below of the precise design of the
DBCFT, we consider this possibility.
It should be noted too that cash flow taxation is not the only way to achieve neutrality
in business taxation. The same economic effects can in principle be achieved by giving
relief for the cost of depreciation of assets, instead of an immediate write-off, and in
addition giving relief for the cost of finance. In the case of debt finance, this cost is
9For a survey on the impact of the tax incentive to use debt, see Graham (2003). More recent evidence
is provided by, amongst others, Devereux, Maffini and Xing (2016), Doidge and Dyck (2015), Heider and
Ljungqvist (2015) and Keen and de Mooij (2015).
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normally the interest payments that the business must make on its borrowing. For
equity finance, it is an opportunity cost, reflecting the return that the shareholder has
foregone on some alternative asset of equivalent risk. These financial costs can be
seen as reflecting a minimum rate of return that the providers of finance require on
their investments in the business. Naturally, then, giving relief for these costs implies
that only economic rent – that is, profit over and above the minimum required rate of
return – is subject to tax.
Comparing this approach to cash flow treatment, relief for the opportunity cost of
finance can also be seen as compensating for the lack of immediate expensing in the
system. Giving relief only for the depreciation of capital assets in effect defers tax
relief on capital expenditure relative to a cash flow tax. Relief for the opportunity cost
of capital compensates for this deferral. In fact, as the IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991)
showed, it is possible for a tax to fall on economic rent with any schedule of
depreciation allowances, as long as relief for the opportunity cost of capital is based
on the difference between the initial cost of the asset and its tax-depreciated value.
The IFS Capital Taxes Group proposed an “Allowance for Corporate Equity” (ACE)
based on this principle, which would be a relief in addition to relief for the cost of
interest payments.10
The approach using an ACE has the advantage of being more similar to existing
corporation taxes, in that it simply adds one additional relief and leaves features like
interest deductibility and capital allowances unaffected. It has the disadvantage of
adding some complexity relative to the cash flow tax, since it requires the
specification of a rate at which the allowance is applied, although this has been
applied in practice in the context of ACE reliefs introduced in several countries,11 and
also in resource taxes.
2. Destination basis
The international setting introduces the second dimension of the DBCFT, relating to
how a country determines the component of a corporation’s tax base falling within its
10 The equivalence of expensing and a rate of return allowance was first shown by Boadway and Bruce
(1984). Kleinbard (2007) proposes a related form of cost of capital allowance. Bond and Devereux (1995,
2003) analyse the properties of various such rate of return allowances in the presence of risk.
11 For example, in Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Croatia, and Italy. Experience with the ACE is reviewed in de
Mooij (2011); see also Zangari (2014) and IMF (2016a).
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particular jurisdiction. A DBCFT would be based on sales of goods and services in the
country less expenses incurred in the country: so receipts from exports are not
included in taxable revenues and imports are taxed.12 This ‘border adjustment’ is
essentially the same treatment as is common under VAT; we explore differences from
and similarities with VAT below. In a sense, the DBCFT would tax inflows and outflows
asymmetrically – since income from sales are subject to tax in the place of the sale
(the “destination” country), while expenses, including for labour, receive tax relief
where they are incurred (the “origin” country). It thus combines both destination and
origin elements. We stick, however, with the established terminology, with the term
“destination” – taken from the literature on VAT—highlighting the role of border
adjustment on payments and receipts.
A simple example makes the workings of the DBCFT clear (Table 1). Suppose a
company produces goods in country A, employing labour at a cost of 60 and with
costs of 40 on other domestic purchases. It sells goods to domestic consumers in A for
150, and also has exports goods to country B of 150. It therefore has a total profit, in
cash flow terms, of 200.
Table 1. Illustration of application of the DBCFT
Country A Country B Total
Tax rate 20% 30%
Labour costs 60 0 60
Other costs 40 0 40
Sales 150 150 300
DBCFT tax base 50 150 200
DBCFT charge 10 45 55
VAT tax base 110 150 260
VAT charge 22 45 67
Relief for labour
costs
-12 0 -12
VAT + relief for
labour costs
10 45 55
12 More precisely (and as discussed later): imports by businesses liable to a DBCFT could either be taxed,
with a deduction then available, or untaxed but not deductible; imports by final consumers would
simply be taxed.
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The DBCFT tax base in country A is calculated as domestic sales of 150 less domestic
cost of 100: a total of 50. The DBCFT tax base in B is simply the value of the imports
into B: 150. If the tax rate in A is 20% and that in B is 30%, then the firm’s tax liabilities
are 10 in A and 45 in B.
The relevant “destination” for the calculation of tax, it should be emphasized, is the
location of the immediate purchaser, not (necessarily) that of the final consumer. For
example, if a US manufacturer sells steel to a French automobile producer which uses
the steel to produce automobiles sold back to the United States, US application of the
destination-based tax would not tax the sale of steel but would tax the automobile
imports.
It is, however, the location of the final consumer upon which the impact of the DBCFT
ultimately turns. Sales to other businesses effectively attract no tax under the DBCFT,
either (if the sale is domestic) because they generate a deduction for the purchaser or
(if exported) because they are untaxed. Thus the DBCFT, as will be seen more clearly
below, is built on the intuition that taxing companies on the basis of something that is
relatively immobile - which, by and large, we take consumers to be - limits the scope
for the gaming that has caused such difficulties within the current international tax
framework.
It should be noted too that other forms of rent tax, other than cash flow taxes, could
also be destination-based. One could also implement border adjustments under an
ACE, for example, though this would raise additional considerations. For instance, it
will be seen below that one advantage of the cash flow approach to destination-
basing is that tax frequently nets out to zero. An example is the taxation of an import
of capital assets used by business, where under a cash flow tax, the tax on the import
nets out with the tax relief for the cost of the input. In effect this means that the
import can be ignored except to the extent that enforcement requires that they are
not passed off as domestic purchases, which would receive relief on the grounds that
tax had already been paid on the purchase from the domestic supplier. This is not true
under the ACE, where the capital asset would initially receive only a depreciation
allowance.
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3. Equivalence between the DBCFT and a VAT with matching reduction in wage taxes
Before turning to an evaluation of the DBCFT, it is useful to compare the DBCFT with a
VAT. In the example in Table 1 above, under the usual invoice–credit method, at a tax
rate of 20%, the company would remit VAT on the value of the domestic sale (30) net
of the VAT already paid on the non-labour input (8).13 The total VAT payment by the
company in A would thus be 22. The VAT due in B, where there are only sales,14 would
be the same as the DBCFT charge, 45.
The only difference in principle between the DBCFT and a VAT is in the treatment of
labour costs. In B, where no wage costs are incurred, the liability is the same under
the DBCFT as under the VAT. In A, the difference in the DBCFT base and the VAT base
is the 60 of labour costs incurred in A. The DBCFT is intended to tax profit, and so
gives relief for labour costs. The VAT is intended to tax value added; this is equivalent
to the sum of profit and the amount paid to labour, and so VAT does not give relief for
labour costs. It follows that introducing a VAT (or increasing its rate) – having in mind
here an idealized VAT, levied at a single rate on a broad base15 - and reducing labour
income taxes at the same rate would have equivalent economic effects to those of the
DBCFT. This is shown in the last two lines of the table: giving relief for labour costs in
A reduces the tax in A by 12, and the combination of the VAT and relief for labour
costs yields the same tax base as the DBCFT.
Below we discuss in some detail the two options of (a) implementing a DBCFT as a
reform to corporation tax, and (b) an economically equivalent reform of introducing a
VAT (or applying an increased rate to the generality of transactions under an existing
VAT) combined with a matching reduction in taxes on wages and salaries.
13 The standard invoice-credit method of collecting VAT keeps track of VAT on every transaction. A VAT
registered business remits tax on its sales less the VAT it has paid on its inputs. A subtraction-method
VAT is more akin to a corporation tax - and the DBCFT - with annual accounting of the sales less non-
labour costs made by the company. In the simple case in which there is a single VAT rate, these
approaches result in the same tax base.
14 Importation of the 150 from the entity in country A would be subject to VAT, but a credit of exactly
the same amount would be available against the VAT due on sales.
15 A qualification that, for brevity, we shall often omit below.
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4. Border Adjustments16
A key element for understanding both the incentive effects of a DBCFT and the
incidence of a DBCFT is the role played by border tax adjustment (BTA). By this is
meant that exports would not be subject to the tax, but imports would be. The impact
of BTA has been extensively studied in the literature on VAT, in analysing the effects
of shifting from an origin-based system (export taxed, imports untaxed) to a
destination-based system (exports untaxed, imports taxed); we draw on that
literature here.
The adoption of border adjustments would appear initially to make a country more
competitive in international trade. But any such effect is at most a temporary one.
To see this, consider first the case in which there is a single common currency, or a
fixed exchange rate. Then consider a border adjustment by one country only; for the
moment we consider only the impact of this border adjustment, abstracting from the
other elements of the DBCFT. 17,18 Moving from an origin-based tax that included
exports in the tax base, the border adjustment would make exports cheaper on the
world market; this would create a stimulus to exports. By contrast, the domestic cost
of imports would increase with the tax on imports; this would discourage imports.
With a fixed exchange rate, and sticky wages, both effects would induce a stimulus to
domestic activity. This corresponds to the well-known effect of such border
adjustments having the same impact as a currency devaluation – that is, in making
exports cheaper to non-domestic consumers, and imports more expensive for
domestic consumers.19 In the short run, this would generate a stimulus to domestic
production relative to foreign production.
Over the longer run, however, we would expect prices to adjust. Expansion of
domestic production would lead to an increase in the demand for labour. This would
16 See Auerbach and Holtz-Eakin (2016) for an elaboration of, and examples illustrating, the arguments
in this subsection.
17 As discussed below, alternatively consider the case of a switch from an origin-based cash flow tax to a
destination-based cash flow tax; this would give the same effect, reducing the tax on exports, and
increasing the tax on imports.
18The analysis here is in the context of the border adjustment taking place in a single country. If it
happened in several countries at once, then the effects identified would be replicated in each country.
The extent of price and/or exchange rate adjustments would depend on relative tax rates in the
countries undertaking the reform.
19 First pointed out by Keynes (1931).
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in turn push up the wage rate, and in consequence, push up the price of domestically
produced goods and services. The effect of this rise in prices and wages would be to
begin to raise again the price of exports on the world market, and to raise the price of
domestically-produced goods relative to imports. When domestic prices and wages
had risen far enough, the initial real equilibrium will be re-established.20 In this long
run, there would be no overall impact on trade, due to the price adjustments.
If instead the country had a flexible exchange rate, the same real long-run effect
would occur naturally – and much more quickly, quite possibly indeed immediately
(with some effect in advance if the change is pre-announced) - through an
appreciation of the exchange rate, which would raise the (domestic currency) price of
exports in the world market and reduce the price of imports. This would not require
adjustment to the nominal price level in the domestic country.21 In effect, the initial
fiscal devaluation would immediately be offset by an appreciation of the currency –
i.e. a revaluation; these two effects would cancel out, leaving trade unaffected.
The nature of the adjustment — as between changes in domestic prices and wages, in
the nominal exchange rate, and in the level of activity — will thus depend in practice
on which of these can adjust more rapidly. There is, it may be helpful to note, an
important difference here between the adoption of a DBCFT and the adoption of a
VAT. Under the latter, consumer prices rise relative to wages, an effect that cannot be
accomplished simply by a change in the nominal exchange rate; with wages sticky, the
expectation is that the effect will come largely through an increase in consumer
prices. The DBCFT, however, leaves that relative price unchanged, and so can be
transmitted through the exchange rate.
The precise conditions under which - as a consequence of adjustment in the exchange
rate and/or domestic prices - the shift from an origin to a destination basis will have
no impact on the real equilibrium have been extensively studied in the VAT
20 See Auerbach and Devereux (2015).
21 It is important to distinguish these effects of the DBCFT from its effects on the levels of wages, prices
and exchange rates, even though the concepts are related. The impact on the general price level is a
macroeconomic phenomenon related to monetary policy, exchange rate policy, the nature of bargaining
in the labour market, and domestic price-setting behaviour, and in itself tells us relatively little about the
effects of the tax.
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literature.22 And, since wages are deductible in both cases, these results apply directly
to the comparison between a destination - and origin - based cash flow tax.
The conditions required for such an equivalence between a destination- and origin-
based cash flow tax, it should be stressed, are demanding. One necessary condition is
that a uniform tax rate applies to all sectors: without this, adjusting only the exchange
rate or simply rescaling process by some common factor cannot re-establish the pre-
reform pattern of relative prices. Equivalence is unlikely to hold, for instance, if there
is a large untaxed sector, or significant variation in business tax rates across sectors,
or in respect of real-world VATs for which rate differentiation is commonly
extensive.23 The wider political economy of taxation clearly plays a role here. Nor does
the result hold with imperfect competition.24 There is, however, little work on the
quantitative extent to which plausible violations of uniformity are likely to cause
departures from equivalence.
It should be noted too that whilst in the simplest models it is immaterial whether it is
domestic prices or the nominal exchange rate that adjusts, this does matter for
precisely who is affected by BTA. Nominal exchange rate changes will have balance
sheet effects for non-residents with assets or liabilities (or contracts) denominated in
the currency of the DBCFT-adopter for example, which is some cases would be
significant; domestic prices changes do not. The incidence of the DBCFT is discussed
more fully below.
Account also needs to be taken on the impact of Border Tax Adjustment (BTA) on
revenue.25 For countries running a trade deficit – imports exceeding exports – the
shift to a destination basis will increase tax revenue. If trade is balanced in the long
run, however, and the tax rate is expected to remain unchanged, the revenue impact
in present value is zero, except to the extent of net imbalances prior to enactment. If
consumers are sufficiently forward-looking to recognize this, there will then be no real
impact from this revenue effect. More generally (and plausibly), however, there may
22 A comprehensive analysis is provided by Lockwood (2001), synthesizing a number of earlier
contributions, including de Meza et al (1994) and Lockwood (1993).
23 Feldstein and Krugman (1990) stress and explore the trade implications of departures from uniformity
of the VAT.
24 The implications of imperfect competition for the comparison between origin and destination
principles for indirect taxation are considered in Keen and Lahiri (1998).
25 Assuming other conditions for equivalence to be met, this revenue impact is essentially an income
effect across national borders, and does not affect the economic efficiency of the outcome reached.
22
be an impact. Governments that are credit-constrained, for example, will not be
indifferent to the timing of their tax revenues; and consumers may not be – though its
nature is imponderable, depending, for instance, on the use made of the revenue and
on consumers’ preferences.
All these (and other) qualifications mean that the adjustment to the introduction of a
DBCFT in practice may well not be as simple – even in the long run, and leaving aside
potentially significant short-run effects – as some combination of a rescaling of
domestic prices and appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. To the extent that
this raises revenue, for instance, the impact will depend on what use is made of that
additional revenue, on how interest rates react and on how consumers respond. It is
important too to bear in mind that the discussion above has considered the
introduction of a DBCFT in isolation, not in replacement of an existing corporate (or
other) tax. That would of course bring additional considerations. For instance, moving
to cash flow tax from a traditional corporate tax would be expected to ease
disincentives to investment, creating a source of efficiency gain itself. Macro
simulation methods can potentially provide more nuanced assessments of practical
reform proposals, though of course subject to their own limitations. The key point,
however, is that the considerations raised by the basics of BTA are likely to be of first
order importance in assessing the impact of practical reforms.
One might hope to be able to draw on past experiences to gauge the likely impact of
destination-basis taxation. But there is, unfortunately, very little empirical evidence on
the effects of BTA (or of significant tax changes more generally) on exchange rates –
largely because these are rarely fundamental enough, relative to all the other factors
that buffet exchange rates, to create reasonable prospect of being found in the data.
There are, however, signs of effects along the lines just described in the work of de
Mooij and Keen (2013) on ‘fiscal devaluations.’ These are tax changes that combine an
increase in VAT and a reduction in the employers’ social contributions26 on labour –
which, recalling the discussion in Section I.3, is much the same thing as an increase in
the rate of a DBCFT. This was advocated by some as a way to stimulate activity in the
Eurozone, mimicking the effects of the devaluation that was unavailable to them, until
offset by upward movements of prices and wages as described above. Looking at 30
OECD countries between 1965 and 2009, what emerges is that there is indeed a
26 The reason for focusing on the employers’ contribution is that wage stickiness is most likely to apply
to the wage net of those contributions, so that a cut translates immediately into reduced employment
costs.
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marked short-term boost to net exports within the Eurozone countries and period.
Outside the Eurozone, however, there is no effect – suggesting that adjustment to
what resembles close to a DBCFT comes very quickly when the exchange rate is
allowed to react. Where the exchange rate is fixed, recent evidence that increases in
the standard rate of VAT are fully passed on to consumers fairly quickly – in about 6
months27— suggest that it is rigidity in nominal wages that is most likely to account for
extended adjustment periods.
There are two other respects, not addressed in these analyses, in which origin and
destination taxation fundamentally differ. First, as set out below, a DBCFT should not
affect the location of investment projects, whereas an origin-based cash flow tax
generally would. Second, origin taxation, but not destination taxation, is vulnerable to
transfer pricing abuse, since the prices charged on cross-border intermediate
transactions affect overall tax liability.28 Under origin taxation, the seller charges tax
at the rate of the exporting country but the buyer then takes a deduction at the tax
rate of the importing country; if the rate charged on sales exceeds that on purchase,
there is an incentive in transactions between related parties to set an artificially low
price, and conversely if it is less. Under destination taxation, in contrast, neither
country charges tax on such sales. And so, as will be amplified later, BTA removes a
wide range of avoidance possibilities.29
27 Benedek and others (2016).
28 The point is stressed by Auerbach and Devereux (2015) in the context of cash flow taxation; see also
Genser and Schulze (1997) in the VAT context.
29 This is a major reason to prefer a DBCT over an origin-based cash flow tax even when the conditions
of the standard equivalence results are met.
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III. EVALUATING THE DBCFT
We evaluate the properties of the DBCFT in two settings. The first is that in which the
DBCFT is adopted by all countries, although – importantly – not necessarily at the
same rate. The second is that in which it is adopted by just one. Our main discussion
relates to the former case. Considering the properties of the DBCFT if introduced in a
single country, or small group of countries, is critical, however, for the issue of
whether individual countries might find it in their own interest to adopt the DBCFT, or
whether it could only be introduced by significant agreement between countries. This
issue is also important for its stability; for example, is there an incentive for an
individual country to introduce the DBCFT if other countries have already adopted it;
or are countries that have already adopted it likely to undermine it through
competition?
The evaluation is by five criteria: economic efficiency, robustness to avoidance and
evasion, ease of administration, fairness and stability. The first four of these are
common criteria for evaluating taxes. By stability we mean that there is an incentive
for a country to adopt a system, whether or not other countries adopt it, and that
there would also be no incentive for a country to compete with others by changing
the basic system or by cutting the tax rate, each of which could impose costs on other
countries and thereby undermine the overall international system. In a subsequent
section we address issues of implementation in more detail, here we focus on
economic principles.
1. Universal adoption
a. Economic efficiency
In principle, the DBCFT has remarkable properties in terms of economic efficiency. In
particular, it should not distort the scale or location of investment, nor forms of
financing choices. We discuss each in turn.
Location of investment
Whilst taxes on economic rent should not distort marginal investment decisions in a
domestic setting, once we move to an international setting such taxes can distort
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decisions on the location of investment if imposed on an origin basis – that is, broadly
where the economic activity, or production defined very widely, takes place. This
decision would be distorted, for example, if the states operating a tax on economic
rents on an origin basis offer different tax rates. Faced with the decision where to
locate their investment, the difference in tax rates may be so large as to induce
companies to locate in the location which is less advantageous from a non-tax
perspective. More generally, a difference in average tax rates on different mutually
exclusive options may induce distortions, even if the tax base is economic rent.30
That distortion does not arise, however, if taxes on economic rent are levied on a
destination basis. To see this, we have to consider the tax levied on the income
generated from sales and the tax relief available for expenses. A key reason for
choosing a destination basis is that consumers are relatively immobile; they are
unlikely, except in some specific circumstances, to move in response to a higher rate of
DBCFT. But it might be thought that there would be an advantage to locating expenses
in a country with a high tax rate. By doing so firms would deduct expenses from profits
which would otherwise be taxed at a high rate of tax (or, if in loss positions, they
would receive relief at this high rate of tax). This is true – but the effect is negated by
the impact of the border adjustments described above.
To see this, consider the example in Table 2. In Panel A, sales and costs in the two
countries are as in Table 1, with the exchange rate between the two countries taken to
be one-for-one. Initially, the two countries levy their DBCFTs at the same rate, 10
percent, which leaves the firm with after-tax profits of 180. From the point of view of
the firm, the situation is just as if it operated in a single economy with a single DBCFT
of 10 percent. This means, in particular, and just as discussed there, that the firm’s
investment (and financing) decisions are wholly unaffected by the presence of the two
taxes.
Suppose now that country B raises the rate of its DBCFT to 25 percent. If nothing else
changes, this, as seen in Panel B, increases the firms’ total tax charge by 22.5 (15
percent of the base of 150 in country B), leaving it after-tax profits of 157.5.
30 This assumes that the rent at issue is not specific to a particular location. See Devereux and Griffith
(1998) for empirical evidence on the role of effective average tax rates on location decisions, and
Auerbach and Devereux (2015) for a theoretical analysis.
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Table 2. Investment Neutrality of the DBCFT with universal adoption
Panel A
Country A Country B Total
Tax rate 10% 10%
Labour costs 60 0 60
Other costs 40 0 40
Sales 150 150 300
DBCFT tax base 50 150 200
DBCFT charge 5 15 20
Net profit 45 135 180
Panel B
Country A Country B Total
Tax rate 10% 25%
Labour costs 60 0 60
Other costs 40 0 40
Sales 150 150 300
DBCFT tax base 50 150 200
DBCFT charge 5 37.5 42.5
Net profit 45 112.5 157.5
Panel C
Country A Country B Total
Tax rate 10% 25%
Labour costs 0 60 60
Other costs 0 40 40
Sales 150 150 300
DBCFT tax base 150 50 200
DBCFT charge 15 12.5 27.5
Net profit 135 37.5 172.5
Panel D
Country A Country B Total
Tax rate 10% 25%
Labour costs 0 72 72
Other costs 0 48 48
Sales 150 180 330
DBCFT tax base 150 60 210
DBCFT charge 15 15 30
Net profit 135 45 180
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Panel E
Country A Country B Total
Tax rate 10% 25%
Labour costs 60 0 60
Other costs 40 0 40
Sales 150 180 330
DBCFT tax base 50 180 230
DBCFT charge 5 45 50
Net profit 45 135 180
But, still assuming no other changes, the increased tax rate in B gives the firm an
incentive to shift its production there from A to B, since that higher tax rate means a
larger deduction for costs. As shown in Panel C, shifting production in this way reduces
the firm's total tax liability, and so increases its after-tax profit, by 15 (the difference in
tax rates, 15 percent, multiplied by production costs of 100).
If the tax rate change applied only to this firm, which was just one among many, that
would be the end of the story. But if it applies to the generality of businesses, things
will change, along the lines discussed in Section I.4 above. As the demand of residents
of B for imports from A falls (and the demand of residents of A for exports from B
rises) upward pressure emerges—as described above—on the value of B's currency31
(or on wages and prices in B, if A and B have a fixed exchange rate). This has the effect,
shown in Panel D, of increasing the value of profits earned in B expressed in A’s
currency, and rising by a factor (of 1.2 in this example)32 that reflects the difference in
tax rates. Profits in B, expressed in A’s currency, rise to 60, which, after tax at 25
percent, exactly restores after-tax profits to the level they had before the tax change
and when all production was in A. Moreover, as shown in Panel E, the rise in B’s prices
also eliminates the firm’s incentive to shift production to B, as maintaining production
in A also results in after tax profits of 180, rather than the 157.5 shown in Panel C.
31 One can also think of the incipient capital inflow into B described in the previous paragraph and the
incipient net export surplus of B described here as implying an excess demand for B’s currency in the
foreign exchange market that is eliminated by a nominal appreciation of B’s currency.
32 Denoting the tax rate in country i by     , the adjustment required is (1 −     )/(1 −     ), which in this
example is (1 − 0.1)/(1 − 0.25) = 1.2. Note that this adjustment does not depend on the firm’s costs,
sales or any other characteristics—and hence offsets the tax change for all firms. What is required for
neutrality, however, is that the same rate apply to all firms in either country.
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The idea that prices and/or the exchange rate will adjust so as to exactly neutralize
differences in rates of DBCFT across countries, it should be stressed, is not fanciful or
arbitrary. The point, as is clear from the earlier discussion of BTA, is that if the initial
situation is an equilibrium – firms and consumers all content with whatever it is they
are doing – then so is that in which prices and/or the exchange rate have adjusted as
described. Indeed unless there are some other equilibria, the adjustment must be of
exactly this form.
If the exchange rate is fixed or managed, however, or if wages or prices are sticky, this
adjustment may not come about instantaneously. Without the equilibrating
appreciation of B’s current or increase in prices and wages, B’s exports will be cheap
abroad and its imports expensive at home. Its net exports, and the level of activity, will
therefore tend to rise. As the pressures on wages and prices this creates build up,
however, the effect would be expected to be temporary.
Scale of investment
That the level of investment is also undistorted when all countries apply a DBCFT, at
whatever rate, follows from the arguments just given. We have just seen that the
presence of a DBCFT in country B, at whatever rate, left the firm’s after-tax profit
exactly as it was when it faced a 10 percent DBCFT everywhere. But when it faces such
a tax, then, by the general property of cash flow taxation shown in Box 1, its
investment decision is entirely undistorted.
Form of financing
Under an R-based cash flow tax, whether origin- or destination-based, financial flows
simply do not enter the tax calculation and so are evidently left undistorted. The same
is true under an R+F base, given price and/or exchange rates of the kind analysed
above.
b. Robustness to avoidance and evasion
No tax system is perfectly robust to avoidance and evasion. However, when adopted
universally the DBCFT closes the most significant avoidance channels found under
existing tax systems: it simply does away, in particular, with many of the problems
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currently besetting the taxation of multinationals, cutting through the swathe of
issues taken on in the G20-OECD project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS).
When adopted in all countries, the DBCFT eliminates the shifting of profits to low-tax
countries through the three most important current channels: lending from a low-tax
country to a high-tax country, locating intangible assets that earn a royalty or license
payment in a low tax country, and manipulating transfer prices.
The most straightforward of these to explain is debt shifting. Under an R-based cash
flow tax, there is no tax relief for interest payments and there is no tax on interest
received. So the debt-shifting channel simply would not exist. Lending among
affiliates of a multinational located in different countries would simply have no tax
consequences. As we set out below, this channel would not exist under the R+F base
either.
Profit shifting through the manipulation of intra-group prices is also precluded by the
DBCFT. To see this, consider the effect of a sale of a good by company A to another
member of the same multinational group, company B, with the two companies
located in different countries. Under current arrangements, A pays tax on the sale of
the good to B, but B receives tax relief on the purchase of the good as an input into its
own activity. If A’s country has a higher tax rate, then there is an incentive to
understate the true price of the good; B’s tax relief on the purchase of the good will
then exceed the tax levied on A’s sale. If A’s country has a lower tax rate, then the
incentive is reversed; overall tax is lowered if the price is overstated.
But under a DBCFT, A faces no domestic tax on its export. B does face a tax on its
import,33 but as an input into whatever activity B is undertaking the cost of the good
will also be deducted from B’s tax base. These two effects exactly cancel out, making
the value of the import irrelevant for tax purposes.
An alternative approach to implementing this treatment of imports, as discussed in
Auerbach (2010) and further below, would be simply to exclude imports by taxable
businesses from the tax base altogether – so that for them there is neither a tax on
33 There is a need to define what is an import. The key issue here is that all goods sold domestically
should be subject to the tax. Broadly, in this case, an “import” would be a good or service sold by an
entity not subject to the domestic DBCFT (and also not a domestic entity excluded from it by virtue of
size, as we discuss below in the context of the scope of the tax).
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imports,34 nor a deduction for the cost of the imported good. In this case, the
transaction between A and B is entirely free of tax. Under this alternative approach, it
is particularly easy to see how the destination basis eliminates certain tax avoidance
opportunities based on mispricing of within-group cross-border transactions. Because
cross-border transactions would simply no longer affect the tax base for either of the
parties to the transaction, a company cannot influence its domestic tax liability by
misstating revenues or expenses associated with cross-border transactions.
Table 3 illustrates this key point that – given universal adoption of a DBCFT, albeit at
different rates in different countries - understating or overstating intra-group prices
makes no difference to the overall tax liability under the DBCFT. The company imports
the good from an affiliate in the same multinational group, and then sells it to a
domestic third party – for example, a final consumer or an unrelated party - for a price
of 120. Both countries operate a DBCFT, and so there is no tax on the export in the
exporting country. The tax in the importing country - assumed to be at 25% - can be
thought of in two ways, as described above. In column (a) the import is taxed, and the
cost of the import set against the tax charge on the sale to the final consumer. In
column (b), the import is ignored for both purposes.
Suppose that the price at which the good is imported is 100. Then under method (a),
there is a tax charge on the import of 25. In addition, there is a tax charge on the
profit of the importing company at 25% of sales less imports - a tax liability of 5. Total
tax is therefore 30. Under method (b), the import is simply ignored, and there is a tax
charge on the total value of the sale to the domestic consumer, which also generates
a total tax liability of 30. This shows the irrelevance of the import price of the import
for the total tax charge. Even if the price were set to zero, or 120, the total tax charge
would remain 30.
The netting out of business-to-business transactions also makes the DBCFT robust to
avoidance strategies used in the context of formulary apportionment systems which
are based on the destination of sales.35 Under a formulary apportionment system, a
highly profitable company could sell its products in a fully arms-length transaction to a
much less profitable retail company in a low-tax jurisdiction. As a result, only the low
rate of tax would be applied to the company’s high profits. The retail company could
34 Imports by final consumers would remain taxable.
35 By this is meant a system under which the consolidated profits of a multinational are allocated for
taxation across jurisdictions according to the share of each in its total sales.
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sell on the goods into a high tax jurisdiction and face tax at a higher rate, but this
would only apply to its relatively low profit. The overall tax liability may then be
considerably lower than if the original company had sold directly into the high tax
jurisdiction. This would not happen under a DBCFT. In that case, the full value of
imports into the final country of destination would be subject to tax in that country.
Table 3. DBCFT liabilities in importing country, with different prices for imports
Price Tax liability:
Method (a)
Tax liability:
method (b)
Import 100 25 0
Sale to domestic consumer 120 5 30
Total tax liability - 30 30
Import 0 0 0
Sale to domestic consumer 120 30 30
Total tax liability - 30 30
Import 120 30 0
Sale to domestic consumer 120 0 30
Total tax liability - 30 30
A third common strategy for profit shifting under the existing system is to place highly
valuable intangibles in low tax jurisdictions. Other companies within the multinational
group that are located in high tax countries may then pay royalties or license fees to
the company that owned the intangible asset in return for their use. These payments
receive tax relief at the high rate of tax and are liable to tax on the receipt at the low
rate of tax. Again, this would not happen under a DBCFT.
The reason is the same as that given above. The purchase or sale of the right to make
use of the intangible asset would naturally be treated in the same way as the
purchase or sale of a good. This is, then, an import into a destination country, and as
such, would be liable to tax in that country. If A (located in a high tax jurisdiction)
acquires a license from B (located in a tax haven) to use its IP, this would give rise to a
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tax liability in the high tax jurisdiction. But the tax paid on that import would be
deductible as a cost for A. Just as above, these two elements would exactly balance
out. An alternative arrangement, as with other imports by taxed businesses, would be
simply to disregard the import and the payment for it. In any case, since there are no
real tax consequences of the transaction, the incentive to locate intangible assets in a
low tax country would disappear under the DBCFT.
Finally, note that the DBCFT puts considerably less pressure on the notion of
corporate residence than does the existing system, though at the cost of introducing a
different notion of nexus than exists in current tax treaties. The tax base is essentially
domestic sales less domestic expenses. There is no requirement for corporate
residence to identify either sales or expenses. Sales are taxed in the country of the
consumer, irrespective of corporate residence. And expenses are allowed in the
country in which they are incurred, also irrespective of corporate residence.
The DBCFT is not perfectly robust to avoidance and evasion. Indeed, certain forms of
evasion commonly found in the VAT sphere, such as fraudulently disguising domestic
sales as exports, can be expected. However, if adopted in all countries the DBCFT is
robust to the most significant and widespread avoidance mechanisms including
locating intangible assets in tax havens, transfer pricing abuse and shifting profit
through the use of debt. Their elimination is a major strength of the DBCFT.
c. Ease of Administration
We examine issues of implementation in detail in Section IV below. Here we simply
outline the main specific features that differentiate the DBCFT – since the DBCFT
eliminates the need for swathes of complex legislation which burdens the current tax
system and increases compliance costs on taxpayers and revenue authorities alike.
Under the R-based cash flow tax, since debt and equity are treated in a neutral
fashion, there is also no need for complex rules that police the border between the
two. Further, due to the immediate expensing of all asset purchases under a cash-flow
tax no rules are required to distinguish between assets that are expensed and those
that are capitalized. It follows that there is also no need for complex depreciation
schedules or to keep track of individual assets and their bases.
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The destination basis also brings extensive simplifying benefits. It eliminates the need
for some of the most significant, yet complex and lengthy, extant anti-avoidance
rules. These include including exit taxes, transfer pricing, Controlled Foreign Company,
thin capitalisation and anti-inversion rules. These rules require constant updating to
meet new planning strategies and their application is notoriously costly and
burdensome. Their elimination thus provides significant benefits of simplification to
both governments and businesses.
On the other hand, the DBCFT does raise some significant administrative challenges
which are new to corporation taxes, but well known in VAT. One is the need to
distinguish between real and financial flows; this is addressed in Section III. Others
include the challenges posed by negative liabilities and the need to levy a tax in the
place of sale, a particularly difficult problem for services and digital products; these
are addressed in Section IV.
d. Fairness
What ultimately matters for the fairness of any tax system, of course, is how it affects
people; and corporations are not, in other than a legal sense, people. But how we tax
corporations does have implications for the fairness with which the tax burden is
shared, both within and across countries. This section looks at the DBCFT in this light,
and at the particular question of the suitability, or not, of the DBCFT for developing
countries.
Incidence of the DBCFT
The effective incidence of the DBCFT – who bears the burden of this tax – can be most
easily understood by recalling from Section I.3 that the DBCFT is equivalent to a VAT
plus a matching deduction for wages and salaries. The incidence of the DBCFT will thus
be the same as that of a tax on domestic consumption net of a subsidy, at the same
rate, to domestic wages or, equivalently, a tax on domestic consumption financed by
resources other than wage and salary income. These resources will have three
components.
First, in transition they will include returns to previous investments. Second, on an
ongoing basis and in present value terms, rents: the return on investments in excess of
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that needed to cover the normal return to capital. But the precise identity of who
bears this element of the tax depends on the nature of the exchange rate or price
adjustment, discussed earlier.
Third, in the context of a country with a fixed exchange rate, introducing a DBCFT
would tend to push up prices and wages. So the tax would be borne by any domestic
consumption financed from income or resources other than wages and salaries,
including domestic residents holding shares in companies subject to the DBCFT. This
could also include individuals (typically the more elderly) consuming from their wealth,
earning a minimum wage or in receipt of government transfer payments, such as
pensions. Neutralizing some of the possible adverse distributional effects may require
indexing such payments, and any minimum wage, to consumer prices.
But by contrast, in a country with a flexible exchange rate, nominal domestic prices
would be unaffected; their value would change relative to world prices through an
appreciation of the exchange rate. In this case, we would expect only domestic
residents owning firms subject to the DBCFT and those holding assets denominated in
the foreign currency to bear any tax burden;36 those consuming from wage income
would again be unaffected. Note, though, that there are other valuation effects of
adopting the DBCFT (rather than simply raising the tax rate under the DBCFT, as in
Table 2) that must be taken into account. In particular, a move to immediate expensing
of domestic investment lowers the value of existing capital relative to new capital, and
a shift away from taxing foreign source income may raise the value of offshore assets.
A tax on consumption not financed by labour earnings would be expected to fall on the
affected consumers, except to the extent that these consumers respond to the
imposition of the tax. In general, these consumers may seek to avoid a tax on their
consumption from non-labour income by changing their behaviour.37 For the DBCFT,
however, some of the channels of response normally associated with corporate
taxation would be absent. In particular, because the cash-flow tax base excludes the
normal return to saving, there would be no incentive to save less;38 and, because of
36 Non-residents holding assets denominated in the currency of the DBCFT country, on the other hand,
would receive a benefit. And of course changes in the exchange rates may have other effects through
contracts or pricing specified in its currency.
37 If their demand for consumption goods is inelastic, then standard incidence analysis would conclude
that these consumers bear the entire tax burden.
38 Unless of course such a tax was levied at personal level.
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the destination basis used for the cash-flow tax base, there would be no incentive for
capital or business activity to move to other jurisdictions, as already discussed.
One possible shift away from taxation that remains under the DBCFT would be through
cross-border shopping, if other nearby or accessible jurisdictions impose tax at a zero
or lower rate.39 With few exceptions, however, significant cross-border shopping has
tended to be confined to excisable goods: in response to general differences in rates of
VAT, in particular, it has tended to be modest. (The treatment of remote purchases is
discussed later). If demand is reduced, we would expect some of the tax to be borne
on the supply side, for example by factors entering the production process, regardless
of their location, such as the intangible assets a company owns.40
This analysis indicates an important point regarding the incidence of the DBCFT: it
would likely be considerably more progressive than a broad-based VAT, which falls on
the generality of consumers.41 The comparison with a conventional corporate tax is
more complex. On this it is important to remember that the latter is at least to some
extent passed on in higher prices to consumers and in lower wages to workers.
Replacing a conventional corporate tax by the DBCFT would remove the normal return
to capital from tax42 Though we do not discuss here the issues that this raises, a tax on
the normal return to capital could, if so desired, be levied at personal level.43
39 This depends on how the place of the sale is defined. In principle, we are searching for the least
mobile tax base – which is probably the normal place of residence of the consumer, rather than the
place of purchase. This would imply that a consumer that shops abroad would still be taxed at her
domestic tax rate. But in practice this is unlikely to be feasible, certainly in all circumstances. See the
discussion in Devereux and de la Feria (2014).
40 An alternative approach to understanding the incidence of the DBCFT is to start with an origin-based
cash-flow tax, which would impose a tax on the cash flows of firms’ domestic operations. In general,
such a tax would fall on the owners of the business. The border adjustment included in the DBCFT would
in effect convert the tax base from a tax on the cash flows received by owners of domestic firms to a tax
on the cash flows received by domestic owners of firms worldwide. See Auerbach and Devereux (2015).
41 VATs in practice of course often include reduced rates on some items precisely in order to improve
their progressivity. As is widely recognized, however, this is an extremely inefficient way in which to
pursue distributional objectives, especially in advanced economies that have quite finely targeted
income support measures available to them. The implication is that distributional impact can be
improved by moving to a single rate VAT while strengthening income support (Crawford and others
(2010)).
42 The same would be true of any form of rent taxation.
43 This is the approach, for instance, of the Business Enterprise Income Tax proposed by Kleinbard
(2007), which combines a rent tax at corporate level with a tax on the normal return at the personal
level.
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Inter-nation equity
Taxing sales on a destination basis but giving relief for expenses on a source basis can
produce an allocation of profits amongst states which might be considered to be
inequitable. If a company produces goods in country A and exports to country B, then,
under a DBCFT, A would not receive any tax on the company’s profits. A system under
which a government which potentially contributes significantly to the success of
business operations by providing infrastructure, legal protection and other goods and
services, but receives no tax revenue – while governments that contributed nothing
happily pick up a cheque - might be considered to be unfair, or at least inappropriate,
violating a view of taxation as in part payment for the benefits provided by
governments.
Note, however, that current taxes on business profit do not satisfy the prescriptions
of the benefit principle either, as they can result in high taxation for companies which
derive very little value from publicly provided goods and services and no taxation for
companies which derive a great value. In other words, there is no necessary
connection between benefits derived and taxes paid. Concern for the benefit principle
would thus be better addressed through the adoption of fees based on a businesses’
footprint in a particular state. Such fees could be introduced alongside a DBCFT by
states so wishing to do, although, of course, this could affect the attractiveness of the
country as a location for investment.
Furthermore, this issue should be viewed at a state rather than at an individual
company level. Under a DBCFT there will certainly be instances in which little or no tax
is collected by states from businesses which export a high percentage of their
products or services. However, such states will also tax the profits of businesses which
incurred their production costs in a different jurisdiction. Viewed at a state level, then
zero-rating of exports and taxation of imports would net out in the aggregate tax base
to the extent that there was a balance of trade, with exports equal to imports. Of
course, net exporting states would find themselves on the wrong side of this balance.
However, two factors militate against the conclusion that the DBCFT would not be
right for such countries. First, net trade positions change over time, albeit extremely
slowly in some cases, and net exporting states might find themselves closer to a
balance of trade or even net importers in years to come. Second, states which seek to
tax on a source basis because of the benefit principle might in time find themselves
simply unable to do so. Competitive forces will continue driving down corporate tax
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rates under the current system and businesses will respond by moving their real
activity.
More generally, apart from the shift to a destination basis, there would be several
effects on the revenue generated from the DBCFT, relative to the revenue generated
from the conventional tax. First, as noted above, the DBCFT should make it
considerably harder to shift profits to low tax jurisdiction. Second, the pressure to
have a low rate of tax in order to compete with neighbouring countries disappears
when all adopt a DBCFT, since, as seen above, location decisions by business should
be independent of the rates at which each levies its DBCFT. Each country could
therefore raise its tax rate without fearing an exodus of either real economic activity
or taxable profit. On the other hand, moving to a cash flow tax might reduce the tax
base relative to a conventional tax, since the cash flow tax provides immediate
expensing rather than traditional depreciation deductions; in the other direction, the
conventional tax allows interest payments to be deducted, while the DBCFT would
not. The net impact of these two offsetting effects on the tax base is unclear, and
would depend on the initial circumstances in a particular country with respect to the
generosity of existing depreciation schedules and the extent of leverage in corporate
capital structure. While one cannot say for certain that these offsetting changes in
the tax base, combined with less profit shifting, would lead to an overall broadening
of the tax base, the opportunity to increase the tax rate without concern about cross-
border shifting at least offers the possibility of recovering any revenue lost if these
effects reduce the tax base.44
Distinct considerations may well apply to natural resources. These are often largely
exported, a major source of government revenue, and perceived as a national asset.
Governments of resource-rich countries are unlikely to be content to receive, as they
would under a DBCFT, no revenue from their exploitation – and even finding
themselves paying large amounts to foreign extractive firms. Moreover, while the
44 Patel and McClelland (2017) examine some of the revenue consequences of introducing a DBCFT in
the US, on the assumption of unchanged behaviour of businesses. They find that, over the period 2004-
13, if the US had an origin-based cash low tax in place, the total tax base would have been almost the
same as under the actual tax system in place at the time. Also the number of firms with tax losses, both
unweighted and weighted by assets, would have been almost identical to the actual tax system. Because
the US had a trade deficit during this period, moving from this to a destination-based cash flow tax
would have significantly increased the aggregate US tax base. The proportion of firms with tax losses
would again have been barely unchanged on an unweighted basis, but would have been higher
weighted by assets, reflecting the fact that firms that participate in cross-border transactions tend to be
larger.
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DBCFT looks to the immobility of consumers, this is a case in which there is an
immobility of the underlying asset – giving rise to rents that are specific to their
location – that can be exploited. There are thus powerful forces pointing to the
retention of some element of origin-based taxation of natural resources as both a
political reality and a potentially efficient form of taxation.45
Developing countries
Business tax reform is a high stakes game for developing countries – perhaps even
more so than for advanced countries. They are in many cases heavily reliant on tax
revenues from the extractive industries, derive a larger proportion of their total
revenue from non-resource corporate taxes than do higher income countries, and
have fewer realistic alternative sources of revenue. All this makes it important to
consider the case for movement towards a DBCFT especially closely for them. There
are four main issues.
The first is the treatment of natural resources. As argued above, there is a strong case
to retain origin-based taxes on these. Thus the impact of the DBCFT on developing
countries should thus be considered once revenue from natural resources is carved
out.
The second is the impact on the tax base. Broadly, moving from a traditional source-
based corporate tax to a DBCFT means – assuming no change in behaviour - losing
revenue to the extent that exports exceed imports, and to the extent that the source-
based tax is levied on the normal return to capital.46 The likely extent of the latter,
however, is hard to assess. While one could argue that this could in any event be
recouped, at least in relation to domestic owners, by levying the tax at a personal
level, experience on the taxation of capital income in low income countries is not
encouraging.
To consider the likely direction of effect through the trade balance, suppose a country
currently has both a tax on natural resources and a conventional corporation tax,
45 Efficiency would call for some form of resource rent taxation, though administrative considerations
may imply balancing this with royalties (charges on the volume or, more commonly, the value of output)
which, though more distortionary, may be less vulnerable to avoidance through the manipulation of
costs: see Boadway and Keen (2010). Similar considerations would apply to other cases in which there
are location specific rents that derive largely from exportation.
46 There could also be some loss from the removal of withholding taxes on payments to nonresidents, to
the extent that these are not already undermined by treaty shopping.
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which applies both to natural resources and all other activities. Now suppose that the
country continues to tax its natural resources at the same level – including both
existing sources of taxation. But for non-resources, it border adjusts its corporate tax.
Then, in aggregate, and abstracting from other factors affecting the tax base, the
country would see a rise in its taxable income if all imports exceeded exports from the
non-resource sector. We are able to analyse the position of a large number of
countries using data on balance of payments statistics from UNCTAD, with
information on exports of natural resources from UNComtrade. We can identify 17
countries out of 181 analysed for whom, over the period 1996-2014, exports
excluding natural resources exceeded imports. These include Japan, China, Germany,
Switzerland and Sweden. Only one low income country (Nepal) and four lower middle
income countries (East Timor, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh and Philippines) are included in
this list. If these countries continued to have such an imbalance of trade then moving
to a destination basis would tend to reduce their corporate tax base. But the overall
effect on their revenue would also be affected by the other factors described above.
However, for all other countries, if they maintained similar taxes on their natural
resources, then these calculations suggest that moving to a DBCFT for non-resource
trade would tend to increase their tax base.
A third consideration that is common to all countries but applies with particular force
to many developing countries is non-compliance. The existence of an untaxed sector
means that the equivalence results set out earlier clearly do not apply – so these may
be further off the mark for developing than for advanced countries. More to the
immediate point, if (as seems plausible) the untaxed sector viewed on its own tends
to have a trade deficit – importing more than it exports - then the view of the likely
revenue impact set out in the previous paragraph will be over-optimistic. There is
cause for more optimism, perhaps, on the impact of movement towards the DBCFT on
compliance: all else equal, remission of the tax on the normal return would make
entrance into the corporate tax more attractive, while the wage deduction should also
make the DBCFT more attractive to comply with than the VAT.
A fourth consideration is the greater weakness of tax administrations in developing
countries. Here the heightened need to refund losses is a major concern. This remains
a major issue under the VAT, and - in whichever form adopted - would be amplified
under a DBCFT or the equivalent VAT cum payroll subsidy. Cross-crediting is more
difficult in such countries, both because of the administrative challenges this implies
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and because there are fewer taxes against which credit might be taken: there are
commonly no payroll contributions and only modest personal income taxes.
Corruption and fraud are obvious concerns in the processing of refund claims (indeed
credits more generally). But the greater difficulty with VAT refunds has commonly
been not too many, but too few, as administrations either adopt strong safeguards or
lack access to the funds to pay them.
Against all this, however, one must weigh the weaknesses of current international tax
arrangements. These, in many respects, have not served developing countries well:
the evidence is that, relative to their total revenues, they lose more from BEPS-type
avoidance than do advanced economies.47 And they are exposed too to the rigours of
aggressive international tax competition. The gains from escaping those (except in
relation to natural resources) could, over the long haul, outweigh quite considerable
shorter-term difficulties.
e. Stability
The existing tax system for taxing profit and alternatives such as a residence-based tax
on the parent company and a multi-factor formulary apportionment system are or
would be destabilized by competitive forces which drive countries to cut their tax
rates. We have seen, however, that the DBCFT would not be subject to competitive
forces of this kind, since reducing the tax rate of a DBCFT would not help attract
inward investment, headquartering or business activity, nor would it be necessary to
combat tax avoidance. States can thus set their DBCFT rates in accordance with their
own preferences, without concern about the rates set by other states. By neutralizing
these competitive forces, the DBCFT would provide long term stability in the tax
system; this is one of its principle merits.
2. Unilateral adoption
So far we have considered the properties of the DBCFT if it were introduced in all
countries, possibly at different rates. But of course, it is very unlikely to be introduced
by general agreement in many countries. An important issue is therefore what the
properties of the DBCFT would be if it were introduced in only one country, or a small
47 See, for example, Crivelli and others (2016).
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group of countries. For considerations of stability, we are interested both in the
effects on countries which introduce it, and on those that do not. In particular, we are
interested in the incentives of the first group as to whether to continue to use a
DBCFT, and in the spillover effects on those that do not, including their incentive to
respond by adopting a similar system – and including, for both, the implications for
likely extent and nature of tax competition. We address the same five criteria as in the
previous section.
a. Economic efficiency
A DBCFT adopted unilaterally by one country would have the same efficiency
properties in terms of scale of investment in that country, as a DBCFT adopted
universally. For the case of purely domestic activity, or equivalently, for an origin –
based cash flow tax, this is demonstrated by the example in Box 1. Adding border
adjustments where some of the cash flows associated with the investment represent
either imports or exports does not affect this neutrality property. Consider for
example, the case in which a domestic firm exports, and thus does not pay tax on its
sales. In this case, the exchange rate appreciation arising from the introduction of the
border adjustment offset the benefit of the zero-rating of exports. This leaves the
scale of any investment decision in the country unaffected by the domestic DBCFT
(although it might in principle be affected by taxes levied on the export by the
importing country). The DBCFT is also neutral with respect to borrowing from
domestic sources, as we discuss in detail below. We discuss the incentive to shift
borrowing among countries to the section on the taxation of financial flows below.
However, location of investment decisions would be distorted. Suppose country A
used a DBCFT but other countries maintained an origin-based corporation tax. Then,
in effect, A would not levy tax on the returns to economic activity taking place in A –
apart from economic activity in the form of sales. This clearly would create an
incentive for companies to locate economic activities such as manufacturing in A, no
matter how low the origin-based tax in country B. Note however, that the advantage
of locating such activity in a DBCFT jurisdiction would not vary with the rate at which
it is charged. This is because, as we argued above, relief for costs incurred on that
economic activity would be offset by a rise in relative prices, so the net impact of the
DBCFT would be tantamount to reducing its origin-based tax on corporate income to
zero. And this would be true whatever the tax rate in the DBCFT jurisdiction.
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In effect, replacing an origin-based tax on profit with a DBCFT could be seen as an
aggressive move in the existing tax competition game. Origin-based taxes on
corporate income would continue in other countries, giving companies an incentive to
locate, or relocate, their activities to country A. This would be true irrespective of the
market in which the product was destined to be sold.
b. Robustness to avoidance and evasion
The unilateral adoption of a DBCFT would leave existing avoidance opportunities in
place; however, they would operate to the detriment of the rest of the world, not that
of the adopting country. Consider, for example, incentives for transfer mispricing. In
the previous section, we argued that if two countries adopt the DBCFT, a company
could not shift profits from one to the other by mispricing intra-group transactions.
But what would happen if country A adopted a DBCFT, but country B maintained the
existing source-tax based tax?
As we have seen above, cross-border intra-group transactions would not appear in
the tax base in country A. Exports would be excluded from the tax base. Imports could
be treated in two ways: they could be taxed, but with this tax then exactly netting
against the relief for the cost of the input; or they could be just ignored. In either case
there would be no tax consequences in country A. But the declared prices used for
intra-group cross-border transactions would still affect the tax base in country B. If the
company was exporting from B, there would be an incentive to under-price the
export. If the company was importing to B, there would be an incentive to overprice
the import. This incentive arises independently of the tax rates in A and B.
A similar analysis applies to the strategic location of intangible assets. Under the
existing system, there is an incentive for companies to locate intangible assets in low-
tax countries and pay royalties and license fees from high–tax countries to where the
assets are owned. But, as we argued above, this incentive would not be present in a
country with a DBCFT, however high the rate. That is because the use in the DBCFT
country of the benefits of the intangible asset would be treated as an import. The tax
on the import would again net out with tax relief on the purchase of that import; or
the import could be ignored entirely. In either case, there is no net deduction for the
cost of using the imported service from the intangible asset.
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If other countries maintained existing source-based systems, however, then there
would be an incentive to locate intangible assets in the DBCFT country, since there
would be no tax on the receipt of royalty or license fees. To this extent, the DBCFT
country would again be operating in a way akin to a tax haven under a source-based
tax system. Royalty payments to the DBCFT country would generally be deductible in
other countries; this would facilitate a reduction in taxable income in those countries,
although it would not be shifting the tax base to the DBCFT country, since the income
would not be taxed there.
As will be seen later, the preferred treatment of financial flows under a DBCFT can
also worsen base erosion in non-adopters, since interest payments may be deducted
in the non-adopting countries but untaxed in the DBCFT country.
The adoption of the DBCFT by a single country is thus very likely to aggravate the
problems of base erosion and profit shifting in countries that did not implement a
DBCFT, whilst rendering the adopter immune from such activity – indeed turning it
into a beneficiary. This is, or should be, a significant concern with unilateral adoption.
The quantitative impact of additional profit shifting opportunities on other countries
will be hard to gauge: multinationals already have many opportunities to shift profits
to low rate jurisdictions. And the impact will depend on the particular circumstances,
being greater, for instance, if the adopter is a large and initially high-tax country.
The likelihood is, in any case, of increased pressure on the devices that non-adopters
have at their disposal to limit profit-shifting: thin capitalization rules, withholding
taxes and the like. While the most direct responses are in the hands of the non-
adopters, the adopter may also wish to protect foreign tax bases from undermining
through artificial transactions and pricing. Participation in the county by country
reporting that is a minimum standard under the G20-OECD BEPS project, for instance,
may yield little direct benefit to the adopter, but can be helpful for others in
addressing transfer pricing issues. Even if adequate responses can be shaped,
however, this – or, as discussed below, following suit by adopting a DBCFT - is likely to
take some time, during which the adverse impact on non-adopters might be
significant.
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c. Ease of Administration
For the country adopting it, the main administrative benefits and costs of adopting a
DBCFT – prominent among the former being that opportunities for shifting profit to
low taxed jurisdictions are at least considerably diminished, if not extinguished - are
much the same whether adopted unilaterally or universally.
Two issues would arise if the DBCFT were introduced unilaterally, however. First, as
we discuss in detail in Section IV on implementation below, there would be benefits in
tax collection if countries cooperated with each other. These benefits would
presumably be much less likely to occur if a country introduced the DBCFT
unilaterally. Second, from the perspective of taxpaying multinationals, there may be
an additional compliance cost in dealing with a DBCFT in one country, and existing
corporation taxes in other countries, although of course businesses must already cope
with quite significant differences in national tax systems.
d. Fairness
Broadly, the considerations of fairness are the same as if the tax were introduced
globally. The tax would continue to be equivalent to a tax on domestic consumption
financed by resources other than wage and salary income. The issues of inter-nation
equity are also similar as well, though with the additional twist of the likely impact of
increased profit shifting out of non-adopters.
The factors influencing revenue (other than BEPS-type through avoidance) would
again be similar. However, in the case of unilateral adoption of the DBCFT, the
behavioural response of multinationals would be different, and this could affect
revenue, and welfare of the country that introduced the tax. For example, suppose
that country A introduced a DBCFT and country B did not. Then a company that
produced in A and exported to B would face no tax on its profit. But a company that
produced in B and sold in A would be taxed on its profit in B, and on its import to A.
This might be considered unfair, but is simply the result of the two countries having a
different basis for taxation.
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e. Stability
The attractiveness of moving from a traditional source-based corporate tax from the
perspective of a single country, acting on its own, involves a trade-off, as discussed in
Auerbach and Devereux (2015), between the benefits of attracting capital and profits
from other jurisdictions and the potential costs of a reduced ability to “export” taxes
to the residents of other countries. A country unilaterally introducing a DBCFT would
in effect be reducing its source based tax on corporate income to zero. As discussed,
this would attract real activity and profit from other countries where that source-
based income would be liable to tax. But on the other hand, a source-based cash flow
tax would fall in part on the owners of the business being taxed, including non-
resident owners. By contrast, as discussed above, a destination-based tax would
ultimately fall only on domestic residents. A move to a DBCFT from a source-based
cash flow tax would therefore have a cost in reducing the ability of the country to levy
a tax the incidence of which is partly on non-residents. This second factor may be
more important for a large country, or one with unique location-specific production
assets (as in the case of natural resources, discussed earlier), and so countries in such
circumstances may find adoption of a DBCFT less attractive.
However, existing corporate taxes are less likely to be “exported” to non-residents
than source-based cash flow taxes. That is because existing taxes do not generally fall
solely on economic rent; consequently, they create incentives for companies to
distort their behaviour and prices in ways that pass on the burden of the tax to others,
particularly residents. This, while there is a clear trade-off between source and
destination-based cash flow taxes, the benefit of a conventional source-based tax in
exporting tax to non-residents is weaker than with a source-based cash flow tax.
In addition to effecting a zero tax rate on domestic source income, the treatment of
borrowing and interest under the DBCFT would introduce a powerful incentive for
adoption elsewhere, for it would shift borrowing and interest deductions to other
jurisdictions where interest is still deductible (at least as long as the other jurisdictions
did not combat this incentive by the use of anti-avoidance rules). Similarly, as the
adoption of the DBCFT by one state safeguards it against a number of profit shifting
techniques, whilst providing opportunities for MNEs to shift profits from states
operating a source based corporation tax to it, it gives these states an incentive to
adopt the DBCFT too.
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For non-adopters, as seen above, despite such possible defences as mentioned there
– and to an extent that again depends on circumstances - the replacement of a
traditional corporate income tax by a DBCFT in another country may, depending on
circumstances, place substantial pressures in the forms of both reduced investment
and heightened profit shifting. They are likely to respond. This may take the form of
either reduced statutory rates or base narrowing measures, while retaining a
traditional CIT, or a mimicking movement to a DBCFT. The former response provides
no lasting solution to continued tax competition. Subject to important caveats –
notably those in relation to developing countries discussed above - the latter may well
have more attractions than the continued undermining of the international tax
systems that is all too clear under current arrangements.
How the incentives for adoption would change in response to other countries’
adoption is a complex question. Empirical evidence – see, for example, Devereux et al
(2008) - suggests that countries respond to a reduction in the tax rate in other
countries by reducing their own tax rate. That in turn suggests that the attractiveness
of adopting the DBCFT would be enhanced by other countries already having done so.
That is because countries that kept a source-based tax would be at a competitive
disadvantage since in effect they would be competing for real economic activity and
profit with countries that have no source-based taxation. As investment and profits
shifted to the countries that had unilaterally introduced the DBCFT, there would be a
powerful incentive for other countries to follow suit. The unilateral introduction of a
DBCFT could therefore be seen as an aggressive move in the tax competition being
played out in source country corporate taxes. This would seem to be further
enhanced by the treatment of interest under the DBCFT, as one would expect
borrowing to shift from countries as they adopt the reform to countries that have yet
to do so.
A unilateral move to the DBCFT can be seen as the ultimate move in a tax competitive
game, as it results in a source based corporation tax rate of zero. However, the
adopting state would not be susceptible to tax competitive forces on the tax rate it
selects. In that sense the acceleration of one tax competitive game also puts a stop to
another and would provide long term stability for the adopting state free from
destabilizing tax competitive forces.
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IV. TAXING FINANCIAL FLOWS
The growing importance of financial institutions and activities within the corporate
sector (see the statistics for the UK and the US in Auerbach et al, 2010) increases the
attractiveness of taxing the economic rent accruing to financial companies. This
section considers how this can be achieved, first under a DBCFT and then under a
VAT-based equivalent.
1. The choice between an R base and an R+F base
As discussed earlier, there are two basic approaches to the treatment of financial
flows under a cash flow tax, including the DBCFT. These were set out by the Meade
Committee (1978), and we use their terminology here. The first option is simply to
ignore them, and that – in the sense of exempting or ‘input-taxing’ them48 - is the
route taken by most VATs. This is equivalent to a tax only on “real” inflows, which
Meade calls the R-base. The second is to tax also all net financial inflows other than
equity transactions with its shareholders, which Meade calls the R+F base. Table 4,
which is adapted from Meade (1978), shows which flows that would be subject to tax
under an R and an R+F base.
Table 4. Elements of R and R+F base taxation
INFLOWS OUTFLOWS
Real Items
R1 Sales of goods R*1 Purchases of materials
R2 Sales of services R*2 Wages and salaries
R3 Sales of assets R*3 Purchase of fixed assets
R R*
Financial Items
F1 Increase in any forms of borrowing F*1 Decrease in any form of borrowing
F2 Decrease in any form of lending F*2 Increase in any form of lending
F3 Decrease in cash F*3 Increase in cash
F4 Interest received F*4 Interest paid
F5 Decrease in holding of shares in foreign
companies
F*5 Increase in holding of shares in
foreign companies
F F*
48 This means that no tax is charged on sales, but tax charged on purchases cannot be recovered.
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In the table, “real” inflows are denoted as R and “real” outflows are denoted as R*.
The R base is therefore simply net real inflows, R-R*. The key elements of each flow
are shown in the table.
The “financial” element is also straightforward, although perhaps less intuitive. The
“financial” tax base would be inflows, F – including new borrowing, interest received
and reductions in cash holdings – less outflows, F* – including repayment of
borrowing, interest payments and new lending. The “R+F” base would include both
real and financial flows, that is, in the notation of the table, would be R+F-R*- F*.
Note that, at least in a domestic setting as noted by the Meade Committee, an R+F
base is equal to net distributions to shareholders – that is, distributions from the
company to shareholders net of new equity issues. Thus, a tax on the R+F base could
be implemented alternatively as a tax on distributions to shareholders net of new
equity issues (the ‘S base’, in Meade’s terminology). This could in principle be
imposed at either the company level or the shareholder level, the latter opening up
the thought of rooting cash flow taxation in the residence of the shareholder, rather
than the location of consumption.49 We consider the S base no further here.
Now compare tax liabilities under the R and R+F bases. We focus here initially on the
interaction between the financial and nonfinancial sectors, starting with the domestic
case so as to leave aside for the moment the issue of the location of tax.
2. Transactions between taxable entities
Consider first the application of the R+F base to both sectors. When a bank lends to a
nonfinancial company, the outflow of funds receives tax relief in the hands of the
bank. But the company is taxed on its financial inflow. As long as the lender and
borrower face the same tax rate, the net tax on the transaction is zero. The same
applies when the company repays the bank with interest. The repayment of principal
and interest by the company reduces the company’s taxable income, but the receipts
to the bank are taxed. Again, if the tax rates are the same, then the net tax is zero.
49 A possibility stressed for instance by Cui (2015).
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Table 5 demonstrates this. In this example the bank lends 100 to a nonfinancial
company at a 10% interest rate. The corporate tax rate is 30%. Taking only these
financial flows into account, the taxes on the borrower and lender net out in each
period, with the result that no net tax is paid.
Table 5. Treatment of Financial Flows under the R+F base
Pre-tax flows Tax flows
Bank Borrower Bank Borrower Total
Period 1: Lending -100 +100 -30 +30 0
Period 2: Repayment
with interest
+110 -110 +33 -33 0
An equivalent system would be one in which the financial flows between the financial
and nonfinancial sectors are ignored for the purposes of tax. But this is exactly what
the R-base does. So in effect there is no economic difference between the R base and
the R+F base with respect to financial flows between entities that are liable to the
same tax system.
However, to compare the R and R+F base in more detail, we will expand the example,
as shown in Tables 6 and 7. Now suppose that the bank receives deposits of 100 from
an individual or other tax exempt entity, on which it pays interest of 5%. It lends the
100 to the company at a rate of 10%. The bank therefore makes a pre-tax profit of 5.
The company invests 100, financed by borrowing, and earns a return of 20%, so that it
has a value of 120 in period 2. It repays 110 to the bank and therefore earns a pre-tax
profit of 10. Given that there are no other costs, these measures of pre-tax profit are
actually economic rent. The total rent is therefore 15, with the company earning 10,
and the bank earning 5.
The position under the R+F base is as shown in Table 6. All real and financial flows are
taxed. In period 1, all flows net to zero. The bank borrows and lends 100, with no net
tax consequence. The company borrows 100 and invests 100 also with no net tax
consequence: the tax due on its receipt of the loan is exactly matched by the value of
the deduction for its investment.
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Table 6. Treatment of Financial Flows under the R+F base
Pre-tax flows Tax Flows
Bank Borrower Bank Borrower
Period 1
Bank receives deposit 100 30
Bank lends -100 100 -30 30
Investment by borrower -100 -30
Total period 1 flows 0 0 0 0
Period 2
Return earned by borrower 120 36
Repayment with interest 110 -110 33 -33
Repayment to depositor -105 -31.5
Total period 2 flows 5 10 1.5 3
In period 2, the company pays tax on the value of its investment, but gets tax relief on
what it repays to the bank. The bank pays tax on its receipts from its lending, but gets
tax relief on its repayment to its depositors. In sum, the bank pays tax of 1.5 and the
company pays tax of 3. In both cases, this represents 30% of the pre-tax economic
rent earned by each party.
Now consider the R base, as shown in Table 7. In this case, financial flows are simply
disregarded. Let us start by assuming that the company still wants to make its
investment of 100. It receives tax relief on that investment of 30. Consequently, it
need only borrow 70 from the bank. Since no taxes are levied on the financial flows of
the bank, the bank only has to raise 70 from its depositors. In period 2, the company
earns 120 and pays tax on that of 36. It repays 77 to the bank, including 10% interest,
and the bank repays 73.5 to the depositors, including 5% interest. There are no other
taxes.
There are clearly differences in cash flows in these two examples. The bank only
borrows and lends 70. And the company receives tax relief of 30 in period 1, and pays
tax of 36 in period 2. But exactly the same real investment is undertaken, and both
the bank and the company are exactly as well off as they were under the R+F base.
The bank has a post-tax rent of 3.5, and the company has a post-tax rent of 7 (43 –
36). Further, if we gross up the 30 of tax relief from period 1 at the “normal” (deposit)
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interest rate of 5%, this is equivalent to tax relief of 31.5 in period 2. The overall tax
liability in period 2 terms is then 4.5, exactly as under the R+F base.50
Table 7. Treatment of Financial Flows under the R base
Pre-tax flows Tax Flows
Bank Borrower Bank Borrower
Period 1
Bank receives deposit 70
Bank lends -70 70
Investment by borrower -100 -30
Total period 1 flows 0 -30 0 -30
Period 2
Return earned by borrower 120 36
Repayment with interest 77 -77
Repayment to depositor -73.5
Total period 2 flows 3.5 43 0 36
If under the R base the bank is not being taxed on its return from lending, then it may
appear that it can earn an economic rent without tax. But in this case, any economic
rent it earns is effectively being taxed in the hands of the borrower. Under the R+F
base, the company and the bank each pay tax on their share of the overall economic
rent earned. Under the R base the company would get no tax relief for repaying its
debt with interest. In effect it is therefore taxed on the entire economic rent, while the
bank is not taxed at all. Thus, the netting procedure under the R base effectively
transfers part of the tax base from financial firms to nonfinancial firms.
But, as the example makes clear, this does not mean that the bank gains at the
expense of the company. This is because the amount of lending is lower under the R
base. At the same interest rate, then, the bank earns a lower pre-tax economic rent.
We noted above that a main weakness of the R base is thought to be its inability to tax
50 Note that this equivalence depends on grossing up the tax relief in period 1 by 5% to transform it into
a period 2 value. This is based on the deposit rate paid by the bank in the previous example. Note
though, that if the discount rate were 6%, but the bank earned rent on its borrowing by paying only 5%
to its depositors, then the overall tax liability in period 2 terms would be lower than under the R+F base.
In effect, the rent earned by the bank on its borrowing would be untaxed, illustrating the need in
general to include financial transactions with non-taxable entities and individuals in the tax base, as
described below.
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economic rents earned by the financial sector. However, these examples show that
this is not true in the case of lending and borrowing between two businesses subject to
the R based tax.
Four other important issues arise in comparing the R and R+F bases for transactions
between entities liable to the tax.
The first concerns any other expenses incurred by the bank. Suppose in our example,
the bank has additional costs of 5 in period 2 – say employment costs. Under the R+F
base analysis, this would extinguish the bank’s economic rent; in effect the bank
would not earn a rent. That would be dealt with easily by the R+F base: the additional
5 of costs would be set against net income of 5 in period 2, and the bank’s R+F tax
liability would fall to zero. The total tax paid would then be only the 3 paid by the
borrower on its economic rent of 10.
Under the R base, however, the bank has no taxable income, since all of its income is
in the form of financial flows. Yet the R base would still give tax relief for this
additional real cost. In effect, the bank’s R base taxable income should be negative, at
-5, and under a symmetric tax system, it should receive a tax credit of 1.5. Give that
the value in period 2 terms of the tax paid by the company is 4.5, then that tax credit
is required to make the R and R+F bases comparable in this case. The taxable loss
arises for the bank under the R base because its taxable income has in effect been
transferred to the company, as explained above. It is true that there may be a
problem of perception, as people may find it difficult to understand why banks should
apparently be subsidized despite the fact that they may be earning economic rent.51
But this is indeed a problem only of perception, since, as set out here, the underlying
economic rent is being taxed in the hands of the borrower.
That raises issues of how a credit would be paid, and in what circumstances. The bank
has not made a loss, yet under the R base it may have a negative tax base. Dealing
with the tax loss by carrying it forwards, even with interest, would be inadequate as
financial firms with underlying profitability could easily be in permanent tax loss
positions. One option would be simply to give a tax rebate to the bank. A second
51 This problem of perception may arise even if the bank appears to be paying low or no tax under the R
base.
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would be to allow the bank to offset the negative taxable profit against its liabilities
for other taxes.
A second issue which arises under the R+F base is that companies are able to defer
their tax payment, possibly indefinitely, through the simple expedient of not paying
the profit to their shareholders. For example, consider the borrower in the example
above. Under the R+F base it has a pre-tax profit in period 2 of 10, which is implicitly
assumed to be paid as a dividend to its shareholders. But suppose instead that it
simply saved the money in a financial account: either cash in a bank, or buying
government bonds, for example. Either form of such saving would be treated as a
financial outflow (of the form F*2 or F*3 in the table above) and would therefore
reduce the R+F base of the company to zero.
One possible response to this is that this is not a problem. The R+F base is in effect a
tax on net distributions to shareholders. So if no net distribution is made, then there is
no tax. If the company buys bonds in one period, for example, and earns interest on
those bonds, then the dividend paid in the following period would be higher by the
amount of the interest, and hence the tax liability at that point would also be higher.
If the interest rate earned is the same as the shareholder’s discount rate, then the net
present value of the post-tax return to the shareholder would be unaffected.
However, this argument does not take account of the fact that there could be
advantages in deferring tax from the perspective of financial reporting. As noted in
Section I, company directors may be evaluated on the basis of the profit declared in
their financial statement; this is particularly true for listed companies. If the deferred
tax is not included in the profit and loss statement (which may happen if the deferral
is expected to be for a long enough period) then the reported post-tax profit would be
boosted. Such an incentive to keep cash within the business may reinforce agency
problems as directors seek to avoid the discipline of raising finance from the debt
markets, potentially giving rise to corporate over-investment. The susceptibility of the
R+F base to the timing of tax payments provides a strong reason to prefer the R base,
at least for transactions between financial and non-financial companies that face the
same tax system and tax rate.52
52 The problem remains to some extent if, as discussed below, financial transactions with tax exempt
entities and individuals are taxed. Then in principle, tax could be deferred by lending to these groups. If
this problem were serious enough, it might in practice be counteracted by requiring there to be a
deemed dividend in place of the additional lending.
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A third issue is that banks may charge their borrowers in ways other than through
interest – for example, through fees. Under an R base, the fee could be deductible for
the borrowing business, and taxable for the bank. As with other flows between the
bank and the borrower, these taxes net out. In the case where both parties are liable
to tax at the same rate, it should not matter whether the flows are included in the tax
base or not. But if one of the parties has a taxable loss which does not receive an
effective rebate then this is not true. For example, if the bank has a permanent
taxable loss, for which it does not receive full relief, it may have an incentive to charge
fees instead of interest, in order to generate higher taxable income against which its
expenses could be offset. This raises the question of how other flows between the
two parties should be treated. On the one hand, it may be beneficial to allocate the
bank a higher taxable income to reduce the problem of taxable losses in the bank. But
it may also be more straightforward not to discriminate between flows, and to leave
all financial flows between the two parties outside the tax base.
A fourth issue concerns implementation. The R-base taxes only “real” flows, and so
requires a distinction in the tax law between “real” and “financial” flows. This is
required to counter incentives to disguise R flows as F flows, thus keeping them
outside the R base. (Note though, that this only applies in cases where one of the two
parties to a transaction is subject to tax at a different rate, or not subject to the tax,
for example a tax exempt entity or an individual subject to an income tax; otherwise
the taxes levied on both sides of the real transaction would net out.) On the other
hand, under the R+F base, but not under the R base, the border between debt and
equity requires policing. That is, as equity is not part of the tax base under an R+F
base, companies have an incentive to disguise inflows of debt as equity, and outflows
of equity as debt. To counter this, rules must be introduced to prevent investors using
hybrid financial instruments for tax planning – for example, having the main
characteristics of equity, but disguised as debt for tax purposes, or vice versa. Both of
these implementation issues are discussed further below.
3. Transactions with individuals and tax-exempt entities
A difference between the R base and the R+F base arises where a financial company
engages in financial transactions with an individual, a tax exempt institution or
another entity that is not subject to the tax. Applying the R base to a bank would
result in there being no tax at all; the bank engages in only financial transactions
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which would not be subject to tax, and the borrower would not be subject to this tax
at all. To the extent that the bank may earn an economic rent from such transactions,
an R base would therefore leave this economic rent untaxed. This would be similar to
the case in the previous table, but with the borrower paying no tax.
This suggests that, even if an R base is used for transactions between taxable entities,
financial companies should be subject to tax on their financial flows with any entities
that are not subject to the same tax, and where the “F” transactions do not therefore
net out.53 An example of this is shown in Table 8. This is the same as in the R+F
example above, except that the borrower is here assumed to be exempt from tax. In
this case, in period 1 the bank receives deposits of 100 and lends 100, with a net tax
liability of zero. The borrower invests 100 in period 1 and earns 120 in period 2, but is
not subject to tax. But in period 2 the bank pays tax on its profit, or economic rent in
this case, measured as the difference between the 110 it receives and the 105 it pays
out. The bank’s economic rent of 5 is therefore taxed at 30%, but the tax exempt’s
economic rent of 10 is untaxed.
Table 8. Treatment of Financial Flows under the R+F base: tax exempt borrower
Pre-tax flows R+F base tax
Bank Borrower Bank only
Period 1
Bank receives deposit 100 30
Bank lends -100 100 -30
Investment by borrower -100
Total period 1 flows 0 0 0
Period 2
Return earned by borrower 120
Repayment with interest 110 -110 33
Repayment to depositor -105 -31.5
Total period 2 flows 5 10 1.5
Applying the R base for transactions between taxed entities, and applying the R+F
base to financial companies in their financial transactions with individuals or entities
53 The combination of R-base treatment for B2B transactions and a form of R+F treatment for B2C
transactions was proposed in the context of VAT by Huizinga (2002).
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which are not subject to the tax therefore has the advantages of (a) excluding non-
financial firms from the complications of implementing an R+F base; while (b) taxing
all of the economic rents of financial companies – either directly through the F base
applied to transactions with tax exempt entities, or indirectly by shifting the tax base
to taxed borrowers.
Such a system would to some extent also lessen the problem of financial companies
having a negative tax base, discussed above. Suppose again that the bank in the
example above has labour costs of 5. This reduces its economic rent to zero. In this
case, the 5 of labour costs can be offset against the rent generated from lending to
the tax exempt entity, implying that the bank does not have a negative tax base. Of
course, it is still possible that the bank has a negative tax base; if, in the example, it
has labour costs in excess of 5.
Note that the financial company should be taxed on its net financial inflows from
non-taxable entities, less all real costs (for example, for purchases of labour and
other inputs) that it incurs. That is, it is not necessary to allocate its real costs to the
activities in which it is directly taxed. That is because, as we have seen above, the
financial company should get relief for its real costs even when it is transacting with
taxable entities. As noted above, the problem of dealing with a negative tax base is
partly a matter of perception as in aggregate the tax base in each period is equivalent
to that under an R+F for both financial and non-financial firms. If costs are fully
allowed, then exactly the same tax would be generated if all taxable companies faced
the R+F base, and all entities would earn the same post-tax economic rent.
As noted, one of the main motivations for the netting approach to financial
transactions is to simplify the tax system for nonfinancial firms by excluding their
financial flows from the tax base. But this requires drawing a line between financial
firms and other firms. Many nonfinancial firms engage in transactions with
households that incorporate financial components, such as loans implicit in
deferred payment arrangements. To the extent that these components increase the
firm’s tax base (by charging a high implicit interest rate in exchange for deferred
payment), the nonfinancial firm might wish to explicitly separate the real and
financial components, as the latter would not be taxable, and also to misstate the
magnitudes of real and financial pieces, for example by overstating the interest rate
charged on deferred payments and understating the initial purchase price.
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However, in this sense, non-financial companies would be earning an economic
rent on their financial transactions with tax exempt consumers; to match the
treatment of financial companies we would therefore want to tax them on such
transactions. The easiest way to do so would be to include all expenditures and
receipts from transactions of non-financial firms with tax exempt entities (such as
individual customers) in the R base - even if they relate to charges for deferred
receipt or payment, such as through leasing and hire purchase. In that case, there
would be no need to extend formally the R+F approach to such firms.
In cases where real and financial activities are segregated, firms may already have
separate operating units, which would allow the financial unit to be included in the
financial regime. This separation would be possible for “nonfinancial” firms with
significant levels of financial transactions. Such firms could then either treat the
financial flows as if they were real (and include them under the R base), or they could
treat them as financial, and include them under an R+F base that applied to
transactions with non-taxable entities and individuals. These two approaches would
have the same tax consequences.
4. International Considerations
We now turn to the taxation of financial flows in an international context.
First, consider the effects of implementing a full R+F base on all taxed entities, and
applied on a traditional origin basis. Suppose that a bank in country A lends to a
company in country B, and both countries operate a origin-based R+F system. Then
the bank would receive tax relief at A’s tax rate on its lending, while the company
would be taxed at B’s tax rate. Similarly, the company would get tax relief on its
repayment of debt at B’s tax rate, and the bank would be taxed at A’s tax rate. Clearly
then, extending the tax base to all financial cash flows does not eliminate the
incentive to lend from a low tax country to a high tax country, nor, for transactions
between related parties, does it eliminate the incentive to overstate the interest in
such cases.54
54 The same would be true under the Tax Calculation Account (TCA) base, discussed below and in the
Appendix.
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If an R+F tax were implemented in both countries, then instead it would be natural to
have border adjustments for financial flows as well as real ones, in order to eliminate
these incentives for profit shifting. In the case of financial flows, we treat the country
of the borrower as being the place of “destination”. An intuition for this approach is
that the bank is essentially providing a service to the borrower, of the provision of
funds for a period. This service is being “consumed” by the borrower, and so it is
natural under the destination-based approach to apply the relevant taxes on financial
flows in the location of the borrower.
An example of how the R+F base would work if used in two countries is given in Table
9, which extends the previous example above by assuming that a bank in country A
lends to a company in country B. Assume that country A has a 20% tax rate and
country B has a 30% tax rate. Under an R+F tax base in both countries, country A
would not give relief at its tax rate on lending by the bank, nor would it tax the return
that the bank earns, since it is not the destination country. Instead, all the tax effects
from the cross-border lending itself would arise in country B. Suppose, as in the
example above, that the company in B wants to invest 100, on which it expects to
earn a return of 20%. The bank in A is willing to lend 100 at an interest rate of 10. In
this case, country B would both give relief on the initial bank lending and tax the funds
received by the bank, both at B’s tax rate. These taxes net out. But, the net cost to the
bank of lending 100 is only 70, since it receives tax relief in B. In order to raise 70, it
must issue 87.5 in gross deposits, on which it will pay tax in A at 20% of 17.5. In period
1, then, net cash flows are zero for both the bank and the company. The overall value
of the investment to the bank and the company therefore depends only on net cash
flows in period 2. But, country A will have raised 17.5 in tax revenue in period 1, while
country B would have a net 30 reduction in tax revenue in period 1, due to the
immediate expensing of the investment by the company. So the overall value of tax
revenue to each government requires an aggregation of period 1 and period 2 flows.
In period 2, the company earns a gross return of 120 – on which it pays tax of 36 - and
repays the bank 110. The company receives tax relief of 33 on the repayment, and the
bank pays tax of 33 – again these taxes net out. The bank then repays its depositor at
5% on the initial deposit, and receives tax relief on that repayment at 20% in country
A. Given that the bank and the company both have zero net cash flows in period 1,
the net effect is that the bank again earns a net economic rent of 3.5 (18.1+18.4-33),
and the company again earns a net economic rent of 7 (10-3). This is the same as in
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the previous example of a single country with a tax rate of 30%. To identify the period
2 values of net tax receipts, we gross up the period 1 taxes at 5% and add them to the
period 2 values. The total value in period 2 terms of tax levied is again 4.5. However,
in this case, this tax is collected entirely in country B – the destination country. The
two tax effects in country A – taxing the deposit in period 1 and giving relief for the
repayment of the deposit with interest in period 2 - net to zero.
Table 9. Treatment of International Financial Flows under the R+F base
Pre-tax flows Tax in A (20%) Tax in B (30%)
Bank in
A
Borrowe
r in B
Bank in
A
Borrowe
r in B
Bank
in A
Borrowe
r in B
Period 1
Bank in A
receives deposit
87.5 17.5
Bank lends -100 100 -30 30
Investment by
borrower
-100 - -30
Total period 1
flows
-12.5 0 17.5 0 -30 0
Period 2
Return earned
by borrower
120 36
Repayment with
interest
110 -110 33 -33
Repayment to
depositor
-91.9 -18.4
Total period 2
flows
18.1 10 -18.4 0 33 3
Net value of
taxes (in period 2
values)
0 0 1.5 3
Shifting the tax base of the financial firm to the place of destination has two
consequences. First, the incentive to lend from a low tax country to a high tax country
is eliminated, so that it is not possible to shift profits using flows of debt and interest.
For example, even if the bank were located in a tax haven it would make no difference
to the tax liability of either party.
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Second, since the taxes on financial flows net out in each period, this is equivalent to
implementing an R base for these financial transactions. This is exactly the same as in
the case of purely domestic transactions; the R-base example above would also apply
to a foreign bank lending to a domestic company, with border adjustments and hence
a destination base. Intuitively this also mirrors the case of imports of goods and
services; for these we noted that since the taxation of imports netted out with the
deduction for the cost of the input, it would be possible to ignore imports purchased
by taxable entities altogether. The R base can be seen as the equivalent for financial
transactions. Since the tax flows in the R+F destination base cancel out when the
financial transactions are between taxable entities, then again they can simply be
ignored. For financial transactions, this again returns us to the R base.
That is, for all financial transactions between taxable entities, border adjustments
could be implemented by simply excluding cross-border financial flows from the tax
system. Therefore the conclusion reached for financial flows between financial and
non-financial firms in a domestic setting – to simply use the R base - also holds in an
international setting. The example can be used to consider the case of an R base,
shown in Table 10. In this case, there would be no net tax levied in country A, since in
that example there are only financial flows.55 In country B, there would be tax relief of
30 for the investment undertaken there in period 1, and a tax of 36 on the total return
to that investment in period 2. All the financial flows would be untaxed. In order to
finance that investment, the company has to borrow 70 from the bank. As under the
R+F base in the previous table, the period 2 value of the tax liability (evaluated at a
mark-up rate of 5%) would be 4.5, the company would earn an economic rent of 7 (43
– 6), and the bank would earn an economic rent of 3.5.
Applying the R base for financial transactions with non-financial companies would
require financial companies to determine whether their financial transactions were
with taxable entities or not. However, it would alleviate their need to distinguish
between domestic and foreign businesses in their transactions, as all such financial
transactions would now be excluded from the tax base, not just those with foreign
businesses.
55 In the example, there would be no net tax revenue even if there were also a tax on financial flows
with tax exempt depositors since depositors are assumed to be paid a rate of interest equal to the
bank’s discount rate.
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Table 10. Treatment of International Financial Flows under the R base
Pre-tax flows Tax in B (30%)
Bank in
A
Borrower
in B
Bank in
A
Borrower
in B
Period 1
Bank in A receives deposit 70
Bank lends -70 70
Investment by borrower -100 -30
Total period 1 flows 0 -30 0 -30
Period 2
Return earned by borrower 120 36
Repayment with interest 77 -77
Repayment to depositor 73.5
Total period 2 flows 3.5 43 36
Note that the application of a DBCFT in an international setting brings to the fore
another reason for adopting an R base for domestic transactions. If financial flows are
ignored in an international context but not in a purely domestic context, this would
cause difficulties with respect to the treatment of cross-border sales of existing debt
securities in secondary markets, where the original issuer need not be aware of the
change in ownership. Suppose for example, that domestic company A borrowed from
domestic company B, which subsequently sold the loan to foreign company C; in this
case C would pay B the value of the loan and B would pass on to C all interest received
from A. Since the initial loan was within the same domestic country, under an R+F
base the amount lent would be taxable for A and deductible for B, and interest
payments would be deductible for A and taxable for B. All of B’s dealings with C (the
proceeds from selling the loan to C and delivery of the subsequent interest payments
to C would be untaxed in the domestic country because of border adjustments. That
is, B would continue to pay tax on the loan’s interest even after selling the loan to C,
just as in the case where B borrowed separately from C and kept the loan to A rather
than selling the original loan to C. On the other hand, if A borrowed from foreign
lender D, which subsequently sold the loan to domestic company E, border
adjustments would exclude all flows from the domestic tax base, including those
between A and D and those between D and E. This discussion suggests that there
would be considerable benefits in leaving both domestic and cross-border financial
flows between tax-paying companies out of the tax base altogether, as would happen
if the R base were applied.
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A final issue is that also faced in a domestic setting – how to tax cross-border lending
by a financial company to individuals or entities which are not subject to the tax. To
align their treatment when borrowing from either domestic or foreign banks, then
it would be necessary to apply border adjustments in these cases too. That is, we
would need to tax flows from and to the foreign bank at the domestic tax rate, with
a deduction on lending and a tax on the repayment of principal and interest. As in
the purely domestic case, these financial flows between financial institutions and
these taxpayers do not net out. In effect, then, in an international setting a
destination-based R+F base would need to be applied for financial flows between
financial institutions and these taxpayers.
We discuss further implementation issues below. In practice, cross-border loans by
individuals should not be a major issue for most households, most of whose financial
transactions are with domestic businesses, although it could be more important for
wealthy households.
Unilateral Adoption
So far we have considered the treatment of financial flows in a setting where the
DBCFT is adopted by all the countries concerned. But suppose that only one country
– country A – adopted the DBCFT on an R base for transactions between taxed
entities, and on an R+F base for transactions with non-taxed entities.56 Suppose that
all other countries maintained a traditional approach, taxing interest received and
giving relief for interest paid, both on an origin basis. What would the incentives for
borrowing and lending, and the location of each?
First, suppose that an affiliate of a multinational in country A lent to an affiliate
located in country B. Then, irrespective of the identity of the borrower, there would
be no tax levied in A, even under the R+F base, since A would not be the destination
country in this case. In country B, relief would be given in the usual way on the
interest paid to A on the loan. Relative to the existing system, this makes A appear
like a tax haven: interest paid from B to A receives tax relief in B, but would not be
taxed in A. This would clearly give an incentive for multinationals to locate
outbound lending in a country operating a destination base, whether an R base or
56 A question arises in this case as to whether and how to differentiate borrowing from foreign “taxable”
and “non-taxable” entities, neither of which would be subject to a DBCFT in their home countries. The
consequences of each are discussed in the context of R+F treatment.
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R+F base applied to such financial flows. (This may give rise to country B using CFC
rules to combat profit shifting out of B).
What of the reverse position? Suppose that the multinational instead lent from an
affiliate in B to an affiliate in A? Then under the R base treatment, the financial
flows would be ignored in country A. The treatment under an R+F base in A would
depend on how the foreign entity is treated. If it is treated as “taxable” under the
DBCFT, then the borrower would be taxed in the receipt of the loan, while the
lender would receive tax relief. Similarly, the repayment of the loan with interest
would be taxable in the hands of the recipient, but the borrower would receive tax
relief. These tax effects would exactly cancel out, so that in this case, the R-base and
R+F base would be equivalent, with no net tax effects in country A. In country B,
however, the interest on the loan would be taxable. This situation would be akin to
lending to a tax haven under the existing system; there would be no net tax in A, but
B would impose a tax on the receipt of the interest. In this case, there would clearly
be an incentive for multinational companies to avoid lending from an affiliate in a
non-DBCFT country to an affiliate in a DBCFT country.
Overall, then, if a DBCFT were adopted in only one country, that would introduce a
strong incentive for companies to shift their borrowing to other countries that
continue to impose a traditional source-based income tax. Any borrowing, domestic
or international, by a company located in a country operating a DBCFT would be
ignored; whilst borrowing by a company in a country operating a traditional origin-
based income tax will benefit from interest deductibility. As with the incentives for
profit shifting discussed earlier, this incentive is present even with respect to foreign
countries with very low source-based tax rates.
Treatment of financial services under the VAT cum payroll subsidy approach
The equivalence between a DBCFT and an appropriate VAT combined with a
corresponding payroll subsidy can be readily extended to the treatment of financial
services. To see this, since the treatment of labour costs is the same in the two cases,
it suffices to focus only on the financial flows themselves
In practice, financial services (other than those explicitly charged for as a fee) are
commonly exempt under the VAT: that is, there is no charge on services provided but
nor is there any credit of refund of VAT charged on inputs. This has been a long-
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standing source of dissatisfaction, as it implies some cascading of taxes on financial
services used by registered businesses – and hence risk of production inefficiency –
and excludes from the tax base the value of services provided to final consumers.
The conceptual difficulty perceived in this area has been that of allocating the margin
embedded in the pricing of financial services between the two side of the transaction,
and hence to ensure smooth functioning of the credit mechanism – something that,
importantly, is needed only in relation to final consumers: for services provided to
registered businesses, the spilt is immaterial, since any VAT charged by the seller will
be creditable for the buyer.
One solution to this problem, developed by Poddar and English (1997), is R+F-type
cash-flow treatment of exactly the kind discussed above. And the reason it allocates
the margin appropriately is analogous to that in which the R+F treatment allocates
rents across firms: taxing and crediting all flows between registered businesses means
that the only revenue that remains reflect the margin enjoyed by consumers.
For financial transaction between businesses, this netting of payments is exactly as
under the DBCFT described above – and so, just as an R-base was seen there to be
adequate for the treatment of financial flows under a DBCFT, so under a VAT they
might equally well be ignored. This would mean ’zero-rating’ such transactions: that
is, charging no tax on provision (as at present) but providing full refund for input taxes
allocable to transactions with registered businesses. Some countries already do
something approaching this.
In an international context, the argument above suggested R-base treatment would
also be appropriate for transactions with taxable entities abroad. This corresponds in
VAT terms to zero-rating. And that, indeed, is already the norm: financial services
provided to non-residents are generally zero-rated. The primary difference between
current international VAT arrangements and those required to replicate the DBCFT as
described above is thus the need for cash flow treatment of transactions with non-
registered taxable persons and entities.
Consideration of the cash flow approach in the context of the VAT led to the
development of one means of implementation that does not require immediate
taxation of principal amounts. Somewhat analogous to the ACE relief described above,
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this is the “tax calculation account”, the basic idea of which is to defer tax liabilities on
financial inflows until the deductions for the corresponding outflows arise. To
compensate for the difference in timing, it would be necessary to markup the deferred
tax period by period. We discuss this in more detail in the Appendix. Briefly, the
reasons for keeping the cash flow approach mirror those for not choosing the ACE
approach for real flows. First, it may be administratively simpler to net out the tax on
lending and on borrowing, which would only occur under the full cash flow treatment.
Second, it would be necessary to specify the appropriate rate of markup for the TCA. In
principle, setting the wrong markup rate could lead to distortions to financial flows,
although the size of such distortions are likely to be small if the error in setting the
markup rate were also small. This issue is discussed further in the Appendix.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION
Each country contemplating the policy choices described above will have its own
concerns and circumstances. These would include not only the initial state of its
revenue administration and wider tax system, but its policy objectives in terms of
such issues as the treatment of smaller enterprises,57 not-for-profits and pass through
entities. There are, however, several generic issues to be faced. Some of these have
been touched on above; the focus here is on others.
1. Two Economically Equivalent Reforms
Most of the discussion so far in this paper has concerned the possibility of
implementing a DBCFT as a form of corporation tax. However, we have also
emphasised that an economically equivalent reform would be to raise the rate of VAT,
or introduce a VAT - here in either case having in mind an idealized VAT levied at a
single rate on a broad base -- and reduce labour taxes by that same rate. We set out
these two approaches first, and then discuss some of the details of each.
Starting with the first of these, the key elements needed to transform a typical
corporation tax into a DBCFT would be to:
 Abolish relief for interest payments;
 Allow immediate expensing for all business expenses;
 Ignore the proceeds of exports in the country of export;
 Ignore imports purchased by taxable entities (or tax them but include in
deductible costs);
 Introduce a tax on imports purchased by non-taxable entities, including individual
consumers; and
 For financial companies, tax net financial inflows resulting from transactions with
non-taxable entities.
57 A number of countries tax smaller enterprises at a reduced corporate tax rate, generally rationalizing this
as a response to difficulties they may face in borrowing. Not all find the case for a reduced rate within
current corporate tax systems compelling, seeing a stronger case for supporting new rather than small
enterprises (IMF, 2016b). Whether to apply such treatment under a DBCFT would, in any case, require close
thought. A small exporter purchasing from larger domestic enterprises, for instance, would be
disadvantaged by being entitled to rebate at a rate lower than that to which its suppliers’ sales are subject.
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VATs observed in practice differ in two important ways from the idealized VAT
envisaged in the equivalence relationship with a DBCFT proposition: they are typically
not levied at a uniform rate on all goods and services, and they do not tax financial
flows between financial companies and tax exempt entities or consumers. Bearing
that in mind, the reforms needed to transform the corporate tax into the equivalent
of a DBCFT through a VAT-based approach are to:
 Abolish corporation tax;
 Raise the rate of VAT – and, for close equivalence to a DBCFT, abolish multiple VAT
rates where they exist;
 Reduce the tax rate on labour income by the same rate. We refer to this as a
“payroll subsidy” to identify its net effect relative to existing taxes; this would not
amount to a tax rebate unless the rate of subsidy exceeded existing tax rates on
labour income.
 To tax the returns to financial companies, introduce a cash flow tax on
transactions between financial companies and both non-taxable entities and
individuals.
Under either approach, many anti-avoidance features of existing corporate tax
systems could simply be repealed, since they would no longer be required. These
include, for example, CFC rules, transfer pricing rules, loan relationship rules and
patent box regimes.
While these two approaches are economically equivalent and yield the same revenue,
their implementation would obviously be different. Consequently, there are
advantages and disadvantages of each of the two approaches, which we address in
the final part of this section. For the vast majority of countries that already have a
VAT, its existence can be both an advantage and a disadvantage.
It can be an advantage because raising the rate of an existing tax, even substantially,
does not generally amount to a radical rewriting of the tax system. Further, many of
the design questions that arise in designing a DBCFT have already been addressed in
the implementation of VATs. But it can be a disadvantage, because most existing VAT
systems do not cope as well as one would hope with all of the issues that we discuss
here in ways which appear preferable – for example, in the treatment of financial
flows. Also, most VATs are marked by widespread exemptions and/or the application
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of differential rates. Raising only the standard rate of VAT and combining that with a
payroll subsidy may then seem a relatively easy option, but it would not be
economically equivalent to introducing a DBCFT; and nor would the equivalence
results of Section 2 fully apply. The DBCFT route may then (subject to various caveats
below) be more appealing.
It is important to recognize, in any case, that many of the design problems and
implementation problems to be faced are much the same for the DBCFT and the VAT-
based approach. We have already seen this in relation to the treatment of financial
services, and will see the point again below when discussing how to define
‘destination.’ Nor do all the administrative issues associated with a traditional
corporate tax disappear. It remains necessary under both the DBCFT and VAT-based
approach, for example, to distinguish between business and (non-deductible)
personal expenditures.
Either direction of reform could be introduced gradually, potentially reducing the
transition costs of moving to a new system. Clearly, in the case of the VAT plus payroll
subsidy, it would be possible to gradually adjust the rates of the three taxes
concerned. And for the DBCFT itself, it would be possible, for example, to gradually
extend the proportion of exports and imports that are not taxed, thereby gradually
introducing the destination basis; we describe this further below. Such gradual
adjustment may reduce the transition costs of moving to a new system, although the
period of time of transition would clearly be longer.
2. Practical Issues
Any new tax raises practical challenges, and creating a DBCFT by reforming the
corporation tax is no different. Many issues, however, are familiar. Some are familiar
because they relate to the cash-flow element of the tax and have been discussed,
together with potential solutions, over many years. Others are familiar because they
relate to the destination element of the tax and thus also arise in the context of
existing VATs. A third group of issues are common to existing systems of business
taxation. And fourth, there are some issues that are specific to this particular reform;
these require more extensive consideration here.
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The difficulties in implementing the alternative approach, through increasing the rate
of VAT and reducing the rate of payroll taxes, depends on whether a country already
has experience of a VAT and payroll taxes. For countries which do not have a VAT,
such as the US, many issues arise in the choice of determining the way in which the
VAT is implemented – with the opportunity to learn from the best practices of others,
for instance in maintaining a simple rate structure, minimizing exemptions and in the
treatment of the financial sector.58 For countries that already have a VAT, it is
straightforward to raise the standard rate, the difficulty with this being that the
existing VAT may well not match the broad-based tax we have in mind here. On the
payroll subsidy element, for developed countries it would be relatively
straightforward to simply reduce their extensive payroll taxes. (Where payment of
such taxes is linked to entitlement to future benefit, arrangements would need to
made to secure those rights; but this has proved straightforward to do, for example in
the case of payroll tax holidays). Most developing countries, however, do not have
extensive payroll taxes, and the reach of taxes on wage income is often limited.
Outright wage subsides would then be needed, posing significant administrative
issues. For such countries, the most practicable route to a DBCFT-equivalent system is
likely to be to adopt the DBCFT itself.
Against this background, we discuss practical issues under five main headings: the
scope of the tax; the need to distinguish real from financial flows, and flows of debt
from flows of equity; the treatment of taxable losses; identifying the place of
destination; and methods of collection. In each case, we begin by analysing the case
of a DBCFT and then consider how things would be different if the reform were
instead shaped as a VAT with payroll subsidy.
a. Scope
Any tax on business profits has to contend with a number of questions relating to its
scope. These include specifying which legal forms of business are to be subject to the
tax, whether there is to be a minimum threshold below which businesses would be
exempt and how such businesses would then be taxed. In setting the scope of the
DBCFT, efficiency suggest that (i) the tax apply equally to all businesses, to avoid
58 Conversely, of course, introducing a DBCFT while raising labour taxes can be a way of introducing a
VAT; and perhaps with more chance of achieving these desirable ends than through the reform of an
existing VAT.
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distortions to legal form or size, and also to avoid competitive distortions; and (ii)
either to set the rate for closely held businesses at the personal income tax rate or
adopt rules that require such businesses to treat an appropriate portion of their
income as salary, so to avoid the incentive for individuals to declare labour income in
the form of business profit (or vice versa, depending which tax rate is higher). (Of
course, this potential problem exists under most current systems whenever there are
different rates for personal and business income).59 It is also important to consider
the administrative and compliance burden on small businesses and revenue
authorities.
The scope of the tax on business profits varies between countries. In most,
corporation tax is applied to all incorporated businesses. But this is not universal. In
the US, for example, ‘S corporations’ are subject to pass-through treatment, under
which profit is allocated to individual shareholders and is subject to personal income
tax.60 By contrast, VAT is normally applied to all businesses over a certain size
threshold, almost always defined in terms of turnover; the smallest businesses are not
required to register for the tax because for them administrative and compliance costs
would be disproportionate to the revenue at stake and potential distortions from
their exemption.
Ultimately, the key choice here is that of the threshold between those businesses
(whether or not they are incorporated) that would be subject to the DBCFT, and those
that would not be. The latter could most probably be subject to pass-through
treatment.61 Two questions arise in choosing the threshold. First, what should be the
nature of the threshold: Should it be specified in terms, for instance, of having a
certain number of investors, earning some level of profit or (like most VAT systems)
59 Crawford and Freedman (2010) and the Mirrlees Review (2011) propose to maintain the corporation
tax for incorporated businesses only, but to introduce the combination of a rate of return allowance at
the personal level, an allowance for corporate equity at the corporate level, and an alignment of rates to
limit shifting between personal and corporate taxes.
60 There are restrictions on which businesses can elect for S corporation status. For example, S
corporations are allowed a maximum of 100 shareholders, who must be US citizens or residents.
61 Since in most countries shareholders in closely held corporations must pay some tax on distributions
of corporate profits, to avoid competitive distortions investors in unincorporated businesses should
similarly be taxed on distributions if those businesses bear the same DBCFT tax rate as corporations.
This has the advantage of minimising distortions in competition between businesses, and in choices of
legal form for businesses above the threshold.
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having turnover above some level?62 Second, at what level should that threshold be
set?
The appropriate level of the threshold has been most extensively studied in relation
to the VAT. This literature points to three main considerations.63 First, a lower
threshold tends to raise more revenue. Acting in the opposite direction,
administration and compliance costs rise the more firms lie above the threshold.
Another though somewhat less clear-cut consideration is that the more businesses
that do not face the DBCFT, the greater are likely to be competitive distortions
between different types of companies.64 Businesses that are not subject to the DBCFT
but are subject to pass-through treatment may be better or worse off than business
subject to the DBCFT, depending on the relative rates of tax.
On balance, the best option may well be to follow the same approach as is standard
under the VAT, and apply the DBCFT to all businesses over a certain (modest) size,
measured by domestic sales. Indeed, an obvious and simple approach would be to set
the threshold for the DBCFT at the same level as the VAT threshold.65 Clearly, this
alignment of the scope of corporation tax with VAT also brings the two reform options
closer together. For any given turnover threshold, the scope of the DBCFT would then
coincide with that from instead using the VAT plus payroll subsidy approach.66
62 It is worth pointing out that one can cover most business activity, or at least the activity of large
businesses that operate in a manner similar to corporations, without covering most businesses, given
the size distribution of the business sector. For example, according to Auerbach (2010), in 2007 in the
USA, 90 percent of all S corporations, accounting for 58 percent of all net income of S corporations, had
at most two shareholders. Only 0.2 percent of the sector’s returns, accounting for less than 8 percent of
the sector’s income, came from S corporations with more than 20 shareholders. So limiting the reform
in the USA to those S corporations with more than a few shareholders would have a minor impact on
the sector as a whole.
63 See Ebrill et al. (2001), Keen and Mintz (2004) and, on empirics, Liu and Lockwood (2016).
64 Further considerations arise when noncompliance is accounted for: see Kanbur and Keen (2015).
65 See though Kanbur and Keen (2015), who show there can be disadvantages in aligning thresholds for
distinct taxes (in aggravating the bunching of taxpayers just below them).
66As part of their credit-invoice method VATs, approximately two-thirds of OECD countries allow small
businesses to elect to be exempt from VAT. Because small businesses exempt from the credit-invoice
method VAT cannot claim input credits, and purchases from small businesses do not provide input
credits, exempting small businesses generally does not provide a significant distortive advantage to
those businesses. A small business exemption is more problematic in a DBCFT or subtraction-method
VAT, because purchases from exempt small businesses may still be deducted by registered traders
(Grinberg (2010), 342-43). This last feature means that one of the incentive to register voluntarily
under the invoice-credit VAT- to enable crediting of the input tax on the inputs of a supplier selling to
registered businesses - will not apply under the DBCFT.
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The question also arises as to whether businesses outside whatever scope is
determined should be allowed to register for the tax voluntarily – which they may wish
to do to an even greater extent than under current VATs, in order to claim rebates.
Efficiency considerations argue that they should be; but this may need to be tempered
by the costs and risk of controlling taxpayers who are a call upon rather than
contributors to public funds.
b. Real versus financial flows under an R base, and debt v equity under an R+F base
As set out above, a DBCFT would likely best be structured to have R-base treatment
for all cash flows but with special rules for flows between a taxed financial company
and non-taxable entities. This then requires rules to counter attempts to avoid
taxation by disguising R flows as F flows.
It is important to note, however, that this avoidance opportunity does not arise when
both parties to a transaction are subject to tax. In that case – as set out above - the
cash flow tax liabilities that would arise on financial transactions under an R+F base
would net out. In such cases, the vendor’s incentive to disguise R flows as F flows
would be countered by the purchaser’s incentive to treat the whole price as an R flow.
Whilst the portion of the R disguised as an F would not be included in a vendor’s
inflows, it would also not be included in a purchaser’s outflows meaning the latter
would not obtain the corresponding relief.
So the avoidance opportunity arises only where one of the two parties to a
transaction is not subject to the tax (being a tax exempt entity, for example, or an
individual subject to an income tax), where the two parties are subject to the tax at
different tax rates, or if full loss relief is not available and one of the parties has a
taxable loss.
Rules to differentiate real and financial flows in these cases would need to be
supplemented by rules to differentiate between flows related to debt and equity in
the case of applying the R+F base to transactions with tax exempt entities. As equity
flows are not part of the tax base under an R+F base, companies have an incentive to
disguise debt as equity – for example, through the use of hybrid financial instruments
- thus keeping financial payments out of the base entirely. But if the R+F base is
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limited to transactions of financial companies with tax exempt entities and
individuals, the importance of this distinction is equally limited.
Turning to the alternative VAT based strategy, as discussed above, the starting point is
that financial businesses are typically exempt from VAT; this means that they do not
charge VAT on lending or other financial transactions, but neither are they permitted
to reclaim VAT paid on inputs. It is generally recognised that this treatment is not
ideal. The analysis above suggests that – as proposed for instance by Huizinga (2002) –
business-to-business financial transaction be zero-rated, while cash flow treatment
(along R+F lines) be applied for transactions with consumers or other non-taxable
entities. In respect of financial transactions too, the VAT plus payroll subsidy approach
could therefore be used to implement a reform which economically equivalent to a
DBCFT; but this would require a significant reform of commonly-applied systems of
VAT.
c. Losses
The issue of losses and negative tax bases arises in three contexts under the DBCFT.
Domestic
Because of immediate expensing, negative tax bases can arise under a cash flow tax
even for successful companies operating in a purely domestic setting. Take for
instance a rapidly growing company engaging in substantial capital investment in a
particular year: immediate expensing of those investments could easily lead to a
negative tax base, even if the company is projected to increase its revenue streams
substantially as a result of its investment in the near future. If a cash flow tax is to be
neutral with respect to marginal investment decisions, full relief, or some alternative
equivalent, should be given. Box 2 illustrates this key point.
As this example highlights, providing relief for losses is critical to attaining one of key
attractions of cash flow taxation. However, relief in the form of immediate refund
could prove politically unattractive. Permitting the taxable loss to be carried forward
indefinitely with an interest markup67 does not in practice perfectly replicate the
67 Bond and Devereux (1995, 2003) address the question of what interest rate is needed in the presence
of risk; they show that a markup at the risk-free rate is sufficient as long as the amount carried forward
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effect of immediate refunds, because of the possibility of company insolvency before
the loss carried forward is actually used - but it does significantly alleviate it. Other
possible solutions include: allowing the marketing of unused tax benefits associated
with these activities, although this is not without its pitfalls, as the U.S. experience
with “Safe Harbor Leasing” from the early 1980s illustrates;68 allowing taxable losses
to be used in the context of mergers with profitable businesses; or allowing taxable
losses to be set against other taxes paid by the business, such as payroll taxes.69
Box 2. The Treatment of Losses
The table below illustrates the simple case of a company that makes an investment
of 100 in period 1, and earns a total return of 120 in period 2. Suppose that the rate
of interest is 5%, and that the company uses this rate of return to compare cash
flows in the two periods. In this case, the 100 of investment in period 1 is
equivalent to an outflow of cash in period 2 of 105. The economic rent earned by
the investment in period 2 terms is therefore 15: the inflow of 120 less the marked-
up outflow of 105.
Now consider alternative ways of taxing this investment, with a tax rate of 30%.
Under a classic R-base cash flow tax, the initial investment would be immediately
expensed, and so the tax payable in period 1 would be -30. If necessary, this could
take the form of a payment of 30 to the company by the government. The period 2
value of this to the company, given the 5% interest rate, would be 31.5. The tax in
period 2 would be 36. The period 2 value of the two elements of the tax combined
is therefore 4.5. This is 30% of the economic rent, as is intended under a cash flow
tax.
Now suppose that no rebate is available for the first period tax loss, but that it is
instead simply carried forward to set against second period income. In this case, the
tax base in period 2 would be 20 – the return of 120 less the carried forward loss of
100 – and so the tax would be 6. This tax base (20) exceeds the economic rent
earned (15). The investment will still be attractive to the investor, since after-tax
profit is positive; but this would not have been the case, for instance, had the
project been only marginally profitable in the absence of tax. This effect can be
removed by marking up the loss by the interest rate as it is carried forward. In this
is certain to be paid to the company. Where it is not, then a higher rate would be required that covered
that specific risk.
68 See Warren and Auerbach (1982).
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case, the loss brought forward into period 2 would be 105, and the period 2 value
of the tax would revert to 4.5.70 Note that this is similar in effect to the case where
an allowance is given for the cost of finance, as under an allowance for corporate
equity (ACE). For suppose that relief for the cost of the investment is not available
until the return is made, but that there is relief in period 2 for the opportunity cost
of finance; this is the foregone interest of 5. In this case, the tax in period 2 is again
4.5, 30% of the economic rent.
Illustration of properties of alternative treatment of losses
Period 1 cash
flows
Period 2
cash flows
Period 2 value
of
investment/tax
Capital investment, and total
return on investment
-100 +120 15
R base tax with immediate
expensing, and full refund
-30 36 4.5
R base tax with immediate
expensing, and loss carried
forward
0 6 6
R base tax with immediate
expensing, and loss carried
forward with interest markup
at 5%
0 4.5 4.5
The example in Box 2 does not include labour costs, so the position under a VAT
would be exactly as the first row in the table, with an immediate rebate of expenses.
An analogous problem thus arises, as is very familiar, under a VAT. It may seem rather
different in kind, since the VAT rebate is as a refund of VAT paid on capital inputs
purchased. If the firm purchasing the capital equipment had no sales in that period,
then it can generally reclaim the VAT paid on that input. Combining this with a
reduction in the tax on wages and salaries would yield exactly the same outcome as
permitting a rebate for the negative tax charge under a cash flow tax. It may appear
different because the negative VAT charge can be seen as a rebate of VAT already
paid. However, the same broad principle also applies to a cash flow corporation tax
charge, since the supplier would also be subject to the cash flow tax.
70 This treatment has been proposed by, among others, the President’s Advisory Panel (2005) and
Carroll and Viard (2012).
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International
This issue of losses becomes more pronounced in an international setting, because
the DBCFT taxes domestic sales less domestic expenses. So if a company produces in
country A and sells all its produce in country B, then it would have a negative tax base
in country A. That is because the expenditure incurred to provide goods and services
both domestically and for export is set against revenues from domestic sales and not
exports. The tax bases of firms that export a high percentage of their goods or
services can thus easily be negative. This could be a permanent state of affairs for
such firms, in which case they will not be helped by carrying losses back or forward
with interest. In such situations, the options of allowing refunds in respect of negative
tax bases or cross-crediting against other taxes, such as payroll taxes, become more
important. 71
If full relief were not provided the DBCFT would be likely to distort location decisions,
losing an important aspect of its efficiency properties. To see this, consider the simple
example in Table 11. Suppose that there are two countries, both operating a DBCFT,
and both at the same tax rate, 30%. A company has expenditure of 100 and sales of
120. (For simplicity, in this example assume that these flows happen in the same
period). Its sales are in country A, but it can choose whether to produce in A or B. If it
chooses to produce in A then its tax base will be 20 and it will pay tax of 6. If it
chooses to produce in B it will have a taxable loss in B of 100, and a taxable income in
A of 120. If it receives a full refund in respect of the 100 of expenditure in B then its
location decision will not depend on tax; it will continue to pay tax of 6. But if it
receives no relief for the cost in B, then its tax base effectively becomes 120, with a
tax liability of 40. Thus the treatment of losses in this case can be highly important for
location decisions.72
71 Under this latter approach, it is of course conceivable that credit due on losses may exceed the
amount of other taxes remitted. And where tax administration is weak, reliable cross-crediting may be
difficult to achieve.
72 Note that the distortion does not come from differences in the treatment of losses: as in this example,
a common but imperfect treatment distorts because some locations choices imply losses while others
do not. The symmetric treatment of losses is also important for the effects on exchange rates, or prices
under a fixed exchange rate regime, which, discussed above, are important for the efficiency properties
of the DBCFT.
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Table 11. Illustration of effects of not receiving relief for expenditure
Produce in A Produce in B
Expenses in A -100 -
Expenses in B - -100
Sales in A 120 120
Tax base in A 20 120
Tax base in B with full offset - -100
Tax base in B with no offset - 0
Total tax base with full offset 20 20
Total tax base with no offset 20 120
There may be some doubt as to the willingness of countries to provide relief for
expenditure incurred to produce revenue which they will not tax. However, three
considerations should be kept in mind.
First, some countries have been willing to accept similar situations under the existing
corporate tax system. For example, they have allowed relief for interest expenses on
domestic loans used to equity finance the activities of foreign subsidiaries even when
they exempt the dividends paid back from the foreign subsidiaries. The UK has
presented such generous treatment of interest expense as a competitive advantage.73
Second, under a DBCFT countries would also tax domestic sales by foreign firms. So
while countries may find themselves giving relief for expenditure incurred to produce
revenue they will not tax, they may also collect tax revenues reflecting business
expenditure for which they did not provide relief. From the country’s perspective, the
revenue consequences should be seen at an aggregate level, where an element of
quid pro quo is at play, and not at the level of an individual company. In aggregate the
net effect on the tax base hinges on the relative magnitude of exports and imports;
this question was addressed in the previous section.
Third, competitive forces provide countries with a powerful incentive to provide full
relief under a DBCFT. Failure to do so would place them at a competitive disadvantage
in attracting business activities relative to countries which give full relief. To take the
example in Table 11 above, if B did not provide relief for the expenditure, the
73 HM Treasury (2010).
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company would have an incentive to locate its activities in A. This would be true for
most companies that aimed to supply an export market. In fact, the opposite problem
might arise in that countries which are particularly keen on attracting certain
activities, such as manufacturing, would have an incentive to compete by going
beyond full relief through overly generous expensing rules or interest rates on losses
carried forward.
Note that the same issues arise if reform takes the form of a VAT plus a payroll
subsidy. A domestic firm that exports all of its output is generally permitted to reclaim
any VAT that is has paid on inputs. In general, this rebate would be less than that
required under a DBCFT since the VAT does not give relief for labour costs. But
combining the VAT with a payroll subsidy would automatically also give the same
relief for labour costs as under the DBCFT. Under normal VAT rules then, the VAT plus
payroll subsidy approach would be equivalent to giving a full rebate for the taxable
loss described above. There is perhaps a difference in perception here, in that the VAT
rebate itself would be separate, and is generally seen as a repayment of VAT paid at
an earlier stage of production. But, given the matching reduction in taxes on (or
subsidy to) wages and salaries, the VAT plus payroll subsidy approach would of course
be equivalent to giving a full rebate under the DBCFT.
Financial institutions
We saw merit above in applying an R base for financial firms when transacting with
non-financial firms subject to tax at the same rate, and an R+F base when transacting
with non-taxable entities. That is, financial companies would be taxed on their net
financial inflows from non-taxable entities, less all real costs (for example, for
purchases of labour and other inputs) that it incurs. As described at length above, all
real costs would be allowable against tax, since in effect the economic rent generated
from lending to taxed businesses is taxed in the hands of the borrower. An advantage
of this approach is that non-financial firms do not need to keep track of their financial
flows for tax purposes (although they do need to distinguish real and financial flows).
But, if a financial firm does not have a sufficient and positive net cash flow from tax
exempt entities and individuals, then it may be left with a negative tax base. This does
not mean that it is not profitable, nor that tax has not been levied on the total profit
generated; it simply means that some important income will be taxed in the hands of
the borrower, not the lender. At an aggregate level, total tax collected will be the
same as under an R+F base applied to all businesses.
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Just as above, efficiency requires financial companies that find themselves in this
position to be refunded in respect of their negative position. From an implementation
perspective this might raise some concerns. In particular, again it is possible that
countries may be unwilling to pay tax refunds to financial firms in a taxable loss
position. As with the problem of international flows in the previous subsection, this
taxable loss may be permanent, and so cannot be dealt with through carrying the loss
back or forwards, even with an interest mark-up.
A different solution to dealing with the taxable losses of financial companies therefore
needs to be found: while the problem mirrors that of dealing with the taxable losses
of exporters discussed above, it is amplified by the non-taxation of some domestic
transactions by financial institutions. One approach might be to allow taxable losses
of financial institutions to be transferred to non-financial businesses that are in a
taxpaying position. This could in principle be achieved, in effect, by making the netting
of business-to-business financial transactions optional, although introducing this
option would complicate the system and could introduce distortions if transferability
still left financial institutions in loss positions.74 Another approach would again be that
of allowing financial institutions to offset their taxable losses under this cash flow tax
against other taxes to which they are subject, for example, payroll taxes or special
taxes levied on the financial sector.
In an international setting, with banks lending to non-domestic tax exempt entities,
the position is the same as for other exporters; relief should be given for costs
incurred domestically, even though there may be no taxable income to match those
costs. This would be true if the R+F base were applied generally, as well as under the
mixed R and R+F approach discussed here. Once again, it is necessary to find a way to
reimburse the loss, in order to preserve economic efficiency. Again, this could be done
by crediting the taxable loss against other taxes, such as payroll taxes or special taxes
levied on the financial sector.
As noted above, VAT is generally levied only on real flows, and not financial flows. The
combination, however, of a VAT reformed along the lines described above – zero-
74 In that case, financial firms would have an incentive to net flows that would have increased taxes on
nonfinancial firms (e.g., payments to them by financial firms) and not to net flows that reduce taxes on
nonfinancial firms (e.g., payments by them to financial firms), as there would be immediate tax
consequences of these choices only for the nonfinancial firms involved.
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rating B2C and applying cash flow treatment to B2B transactions – and payroll subsidy
would be equivalent to giving an immediate tax rebate under the DBCFT.
d. Destination
A central element in the implementation of a DBCFT would be operationalizing the
relevant notion of “destination”, identifying “exports” to be taken out of tax and
“imports” to be brought in. In setting about this, the design of a DBCFT can usefully
draw on experience under the VAT, for which notions of destination have been most
fully discussed and developed.75
The OECD defines the destination principle as the “principle whereby internationally
traded services and intangibles should be subject to VAT in their jurisdiction of
consumption” (OECD, 2013).76 This clearly identifies the VAT notion of “destination”
as a proxy for the place of consumption. However, the fundamental principle
underlying the DBCFT is not that the tax should be levied in the place of consumption
per se, but that the tax rate that is ultimately important should be that of a place of
relative immobility; and a more immobile location than the place of consumption is
likely to be the place of residence of the consumer, rather than the place of
consumption.
The use of proxies is a near-universal feature of VAT systems, recommended by the
OECD as an appropriate way in which to establish destination. The complexity of this
approach varies. For example, the European VAT system has been particularly
complex, with determination of the place of taxation of any specific transaction
depending on such issues as: whether the supply involved goods or services; the
identity of the acquirer, in particular whether she is a VAT registered person; the
timing of the supply; the location of the supply; and the nature of the goods or services
supplied.77
75 It has to be said, however, that there has been endless scope for confusion in the VAT context in the
both the usage of the term ‘destination’ and the notion of ‘consumption’: see Keen and Hellerstein
(2009-10).
76 OECD (2013), as above, p. 3.
77 See de la Feria (2009).
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For the purposes of implementing a DBCFT, Devereux and de la Feria (2014) analyse in
some detail the use of proxies for “destination” in VAT. Taking into account the aim of
having a relatively immobile tax base, they recommend the use of the customer
location proxy, defined as “the location, residence, or place of business of the
customer, the person to whom the seller has a contractual legal obligation to supply
the goods.” They propose this for goods and services and for both business-to-
business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions.
For cross-border trade in goods, they argue that this would achieve a definition of
destination in most cases with minimal complexity.78 It is possible that in some cases
the customer location proxy might not lead to taxation in the country of destination.
But for simplicity, and as long as this does not create administrative difficulties or
opportunities for avoidance or fraud, using a single proxy avoids many of the common
problems in existing systems of VAT.
Establishing the destination of services can be more complex,79 and a challenge for
VAT design is how to identify the destination of services in the absence of physical
flows.80 For implementing a DBCFT, Devereux and de la Feria (2014) argue that the
customer location proxy would work well in most cases, and this is indeed
recommended by the OECD as the main rule for B2B transactions. In B2B transactions
this proxy can be easily applied by reference to the business agreement, though it can
be problematic where the customer has establishments in more than one jurisdiction
and the services are used by one or more establishments under an internal recharge
arrangement.81
B2C transactions in cross-border services create difficulties for administrative
obligations, since applying the customer location proxy may result in a requirement to
register for VAT purposes in every jurisdiction where services are received. If these
administrative obligations can be overcome then the customer location could work as
a good proxy for establishing destination, without any need to use further proxies.
78 Using this proxy alone may not lead to taxation in the country of consumption. For example, when an
intermediary buys goods to be consumed by someone else, other proxies are often used in conjunction,
such as the place of effective use or enjoyment. This however is not a problem for the DBCFT since
destination is not proxy for consumption.
79The OECD has issued several guidelines on how to apply the destination principle to services,
culminating in the release of a complete set in 2015; see OECD (2013).
80 Keen and Hellerstein (2009-10).
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However, Devereux and de la Feria propose that in exceptional circumstances the
proxy used vary from the customer location proxy, particularly for B2C transactions
where that rule would be too burdensome. This will be the case where the supply of
services requires the physical presence of both the supplier and the customer in some
way, such as restaurant services, concerts and sports events. In such cases they
recommend the place of performance of a service or the place of location of a good as
a proxy, since the destination is readily identifiable as the place where the supply is
carried out, and applying the customer location proxy could potentially lead to
distortive results and fraud, as well as being burdensome for suppliers. However, the
use of this proxy in these cases creates a minor distortion between cross-border
shopping - where the place of location proxy is used - and e-commerce - where the
customer location proxy would be used.
Of course, if the the reform took the form of an increase in the rate of an existing VAT
combined with a payroll subsidy, then it would appear to be more straightforward
simply to use the existing VAT law, rather than to introduce reforms to the definition
of “destination.” Increasingly, however, countries are in any case likely to model their
rules around the OECD Guidelines. For countries that do not currently have a VAT,
such as the US, then there is no such easy route to increasing use of the destination
principle. In these cases, the discussion above about how to define destination holds
irrespective of the form the reform takes.
e. Collection
The collection of the DBCFT raises some challenges. A DBCFT could leave B2B
transactions between entities taxed in distinct countries out of the tax base entirely.
Exports would be zero-rated, and as discussed above, imports purchased by
businesses could be ignored (either taxed but with relief, or neither). So the
challenges for collecting revenue under a DBCFT relate primarily to cross-border B2C
transactions. (And, of course, one issue is to be able to identify whether a transaction
is B2B or B2C).
The DBCFT would tax imports purchased by individual consumers and non-taxable
entities. Where a customer purchases a good or service directly from a business in
another country, a tax should be levied at the rate of the destination country. Two
options open to the destination country are to collect the tax from the exporting
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company or from the consumer. The former appears to be the more realistic option,
although not without difficulties of its own, especially in the absence of fiscal borders,
or for digital products, as is clear from the operation of VAT. These are, in any case,
issues that already arise under the VAT.
The DBCFT could be seen as a tax on the net domestic inflows of domestic businesses,
plus a tax on non-resident businesses that export to domestic consumers. This is a
familiar problem for VAT systems based on destination. In principle it would be
necessary for the company to register for tax in the country into which it is exporting
the good or service; this is difficult to administer for relatively small exporters,
particularly when the good or service can be downloaded electronically, or where
there are no customs operations at borders. The exporter must also identify the
location of its customer, and whether the customer is a business or a consumer. The
tax authority must identify companies from around the world that export to its
country, and also guard against any opportunities for fraud if final consumers pretend
they are businesses. For this purpose, gathering information from intermediaries such
as credit card and other payment companies will be an important enforcement tool,
both for a DBCFT and a VAT.
One innovation in the EU that could be applied amongst cooperating countries is a
“one stop shop”, as proposed by Devereux and de la Feria (2014) and the Gaspar
Committee (2014). Under such a system a company selling into several separate
countries would need to register in only one; in many cases that is likely to be the
origin country from which the company exports. The tax authority in that country
would administer the DBCFT at the rate of the country to which the good or service is
exported. Going beyond what has yet been achieved in Europe, one could envisage a
clearing arrangement at the aggregate level, where payments are made between tax
authorities in recognition of the appropriate recipient of the tax. Such cooperation
would clearly create a significant administrative simplicity relative to the case in which
the exporter is required to register and pay tax in each country in to which it exports.
It is worth noting that the one-stop-shop approach makes the need to deal with a
negative tax base in a specific business less likely. Suppose, for example, that a
business in A exports to a consumer in B. The tax authority in A charges tax on sales in
B at B’s tax rate, net of relief for expenses incurred in A and A’s tax rate. As long as the
business is profitable overall, and tax rates are not too different, then it is likely that
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the business will have a positive tax base in A. The implicit negative tax base in A
would be netted against similar implicit negative tax bases in B for business in B
exporting to A, and would be cleared at an aggregate level.
The implementation of collecting a tax on imports by individuals is broadly similar
whether the DBCFT is introduced in its corporation tax form, or as a VAT plus payroll
subsidy.
f. Tax Treaties and the WTO
It is unclear whether the DBCFT would be considered as an income tax which would
fall within the ambit of bilateral tax treaties. If so, then it would clearly be in violation
of a number of provisions of such treaties. In this case, the two parties to the treaty
may be able to renegotiate the treaty provisions, but if that were not possible, it is
possible that the treaty would be terminated. If the DBCFT was considered not to fall
within the ambit of the treaty, then the treaty could continue, but the non-DBCFT
country would not be obliged to give any credit against tax levied by the DBCFT
country.
It is also critically important to recognize that many (e.g., Schön, 2016) have argued
that a DBCFT would be inconsistent with WTO rules. The primary concern with the
DBCFT under WTO rules relates to the deduction for labour costs. Compare the
purchase of an imported good with that of an identical domestically-produced good.
The labour costs of the latter are allowed as a deduction in the country of sale – since
in this case it is also the country of origin. But no comparable relief is given in the
country of sale for the labour costs incurred in producing the imported good. It is
argued that this makes the DBCFT incompatible with WTO rules.
In contrast, a credit-invoice VAT on a destination-basis is unambiguously WTO
compliant since it does not give relief for either form of labour costs. So too, of course
is reducing payroll taxes, or even instituting a general wage subsidy. The VAT cum
payroll subsidy equivalent to the DBCFT would thus face no prospect of legal
challenge in the WTO or any need for re-negotiation of trade agreements (President’s
Advisory Panel, 2005; Hufbauer, 1996; Schön, 2016.)
85
To economists, of course, this legal distinction between two equivalent tax structures
makes no sense. The only difference in practical terms is that the relief for labour
costs is given inside the DBCFT, but as a standalone measure under the VAT cum
payroll subsidy approach. But there may also be equivalent intermediate approaches
under which the relief for labour costs is more of a standalone measure. As we have
argued above in Section II (1)(a), due to exchange rate movements or wage and price
adjustments under a fixed exchange rate, neither reform option creates any
discrimination in favour of domestically produced goods. A reduction in payroll taxes
does encourage domestic production to the extent that it lowers domestic production
costs; but this is true of any reduction in source-based tax rates.
The fact remains, however, that because WTO compliance is determined by
interpretation of existing legal agreements and not by virtue of economic
equivalences, it is unlikely that a DBCFT, drafted with an integrated wage subsidy,
would, if challenged, be held to be WTO compliant. Without a separation of the wage
component, a renegotiation of those agreements would therefore be likely to be
required.
g. Transitional issues
Moving to a cash flow tax base would introduce well-known transitional issues of
implementation. For example, there is a question of how to treat the pre-
enactment basis in existing assets, including plant, equipment, and inventory.
Proponents of cash-flow taxes have typically recommended deductions over time for
a business’s pre-enactment basis.82 Similar issues arise in how to treat pre-enactment
debt, pre-enactment loss carry-forwards and unused business tax credits. We do not
explore these here, though none seems unmanageable.
Consideration also needs to be given to the possible announcement effects of reform.
In a fixed exchange rate regime context, for example, with sticky wages one might
expect forward purchasing, particularly of durables, in advance of the expected
increase in consumer prices83 (which then may itself be to some degree brought
82 President’s Advisory Panel (2005) (who proposed a five-year period for deduction of basis) and Carroll
and Viard (2012) (who proposed a 10-year period).
83 Evidence of such effects can be found in Danninger and Carare (2008) and Büttner and Madzharova
(2016).
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forward). With a flexible exchange rate, the nominal appreciation from BTA would be
expected to start in advance of implementation, bringing forward balance sheet and
wealth effects and influencing trade as well.
As noted above, either the DBCFT or the VAT plus payroll subsidy approach could be
introduced gradually. But perhaps most easily, it could be introduced by a gradual
increase in the rate of VAT (although this would be subject to concerns about multiple
rates), a gradual reduction in the payroll tax and a gradual reduction in the rate of
existing corporation tax. Indeed, in the absence of any fundamental reform, it seems
likely that trends in this direction – similar to the fiscal devaluation discussed above -
will continue, prompted by strong underlying economic forces of competition
between countries. While this process continues, VATs and corporate income taxes
could co-exist. For countries that wish to maintain corporate income taxes – to
counter the possibility that a DBCFT would serve to shelter capital income of the
business’s investors, or because they would like to continue to tax domestic
production – then increasing VAT and reducing corporate income taxes and payroll
taxes may be an attractive alternative to the full implementation of a DBCFT.
h. Other issues in comparing the two approaches
A variety of other issues also arise in choosing between the introduction of a DBCFT
and the alternative approach of increasing the rate of an idealized VAT (or introducing
a new one).
The credit-method VAT has an advantage over the DBCFT approach, which is similar
to that of a subtraction-method VAT, since it has now been put in place in more than
160 countries worldwide. There is therefore considerable experience of how they
work best. By contrast, there is little experience with a DBCFT approach, or with the
subtraction-method VAT.84 As noted above, there is an advantage of the invoice-
credit approach where small businesses, non-profit organizations, and/or state and
local governments are exempt from the tax.85
84 Many analysts have described the Japanese VAT as a subtraction-method tax. See, e.g., Bartlett
(2009), Grieco and Hufbauer (2005). Alan Schenk and Oliver Oldman more accurately describe it as a
“credit-subtraction” VAT, as opposed to the “sales-subtraction VAT”; see Schenk and Oldman (2007).
85 See, for example, Grinberg (2010), Weisbach (2000) and McLure (1997, 1987).
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The invoice-credit approach also has an advantage where it is desired to have more
than one rate, although in general, the presumption would be that the DBCFT should
apply at the same rate for all goods. Indeed, one problem with relying on existing
VATs is that they generally exclude many goods and services from the tax base. This
would suggest that the VAT approach would be more attractive in countries which
have a broader VAT base or no VAT at all.
For a country without an existing VAT that wants to continue to tax production and so
does not wish to eliminate its source-based corporate tax, adopting a DBCFT would
seem to require two business tax regimes, which could be administratively
burdensome. However, if the country were willing to convert its existing corporate tax
to a cash flow tax that is only partially destination-based, administrative burdens
would be minimised. For example, if a country adopted a cash flow tax system
generally with a 25% tax rate and provided that exports were 40% zero-rated for the
tax and imports were 40% non-deductible, then the system would be equivalent to a
DBCFT at 10% plus a source-based cash flow tax on production at 15%. (Indeed one
could envisage this a structure for gradual movement towards a full DBCFT, gradually
increasing that 40%). The tax on production would be similar to a corporate income
tax, but by allowing expensing and disallowing interest deductions, it would avoid the
distortions created by debt financing and depreciation deductions.
A VAT, unlike the DBCFT, taxes consumption out of all wage income, including high
wage income, as well as out of rents from capital. In some countries, political barriers
may limit high tax rates on wage income. In such instances, coupling a VAT with
payroll tax relief for low and moderate wage earners may achieve more progressivity
than a DBCFT with wages taxed only at the individual level.
In the previous section we discussed the problem that exporting firms would have a
negative tax liability under the DBCFT, and possible approaches to this. A lack of
refunds in a DBCFT might create distortions in the locations of both production and
corporate residence. The problem is reduced in the case of a combination of VAT and
payroll subsidy. But as noted above, the VAT and payroll subsidy approach would in
effect be equivalent to giving an immediate rebate for taxable losses under the
corporation tax or subtraction-method VAT approach. In effect the potential tax “loss”
observed in the DBCFT due to wage expenses not being matched by income is
incorporated into the reduction in the payroll tax.
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Unlike a VAT, a DBCFT – and a payroll subsidy or tax reduction - must identify and give
relief for wages. As noted above, this is generally problematic for all taxes on the
income derived by closely held businesses, in that wages must be distinguished from
non-deductible payments to the firm’s suppliers of capital. In general, this problem
cannot be solved completely without some form of rules that distinguish between
returns to capital and returns to the labour of capital providers. In the U.S., for
example, the Internal Revenue Service has tried to limit wages to “reasonable
compensation.” Since partnerships and other flow-through entities are typically taxed
on their capital and labour income, this problem has not arisen for such entities. But
where business income is taxed at substantially lower rates than wage income, rules
distinguishing the two are necessary. This is true regardless of whether a country
adopts a DBCFT or VAT with payroll subsidy; rather it is a function of whether after
either form of tax is adopted, wages are taxed at higher rates.
One further issue is how the two alternative approaches would be treated in financial
accounting. The treatment of credit-invoice VATs is well settled: the tax has no effect
on earnings reported to shareholders. But the financial accounting of the DBCFT is
uncertain. It could be treated as an operating expense. Alternatively, it could be
treated as an income tax. The latter treatment could lead to serious distortions if
behaviour is driven by profits as reported in the financial accounts, due to the
innumerable timing differences between a cash flow tax and an income tax.
3. Final Thoughts
The DBCFT is an unfamiliar concept to many, and its economic consequences –
especially the impact of the border tax adjustment on exchange rates and prices – are
difficult to explain and to understand. Yet the destination element of the DBCFT is
taken from the VAT, which was also once unfamiliar – and may continue to be in
countries that have not yet adopted one. We believe that there is a need for clear,
dispassionate analysis of the complex issues involved in discussing international tax
and its potential reform; that is what this paper - and the book of which it is to be part
- has tried to provide.
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APPENDIX
Cash flow treatment v mark-up treatment for financial flows
In our discussion of the treatment of financial flows, we mentioned the possibility of
defer tax liabilities on financial inflows until the deductions for the corresponding
outflows arise. The deferred values would be identified in a “tax calculation account”
(TCA).86
We illustrate this idea in the Table below. In the table a company borrows 100 from a
bank in period 1; the tax rate is 30%. Under the R+F base, the bank would receive tax
relief of 30, and the borrower would pay tax of 30. In period 2, borrower repays 110,
including 10 of interest. Again, under the R+F base, the bower would receive tax relief
of 33, and the bank would pay tax of 33. Under the TCA, however, the period 1
liabilities would be deferred and carried forward to period 2. Assuming a markup of 5%
on the carried forward amounts, the bank would have a brought forward deferred
asset in period 2 of 31.5, and the company would have a brought forward deferred
liability of 31.5. These would be set against the notional tax payment of 33 for the
bank, and notional tax relief of 33 for the company. This implies that the only tax
liabilities would be in period 2; a tax charge of 1.5 for the bank offset by tax relief of
1.5 for the company.
Treatment of Financial Flows under the TCA
Period 1:
Lending
Period 2:
Repayment with
interest
Pre-tax cash flows
Bank -100 +110
Borrower 100 -110
Carried forward deferred
tax asset or liability
Bank 30 -
Borrower -30 -
Tax
Bank 0 1.5
Borrower 0 -1.5
86 See Poddar and English (1997), Merrill (2011).
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More generally, the bank’s tax liability in period 2 would be positive or negative
depending on whether the interest rate on borrowing was less than, or greater than,
the rate of markup. As long as the rate of markup matched the company’s discount
rate, then this approach would generate exactly the same net present value of tax
payments as the R+F base.
The timing of the TCA approach more closely resembles that of the current
approach to interest deduction and taxation, with no immediate tax consequences
of borrowing or lending. Since we are advocating R-base treatment for financial
flows between tax-paying entities, the application of TCA treatment would only be
on transactions between a financial company and tax exempt entities and
individuals. in the example above with a tax exempt entity, the bank would simply pay
tax of 1.5 in period 2.
An advantage of the F approach over the TCA approach is that it removes the need to
determine the appropriate interest rate to use for the markup in the TCA account. As
is clear from the example above, the rate of markup is crucial in determining the size
of the total tax associated with borrowing, including whether the tax is positive or
negative. If the rate is set too low, then there could be an effective subsidy to the
use of debt. Correspondingly, if it is set too high, then the tax would partly fall on
normal income as well as economic rent.
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